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ABSTRACT

As cloud computing has become a trend in the computing world, understanding
its security concerns becomes essential for improving service quality and
expanding business scale. This dissertation studies the security issues in a
public cloud from three aspects. First, we investigate a new threat called power
attack in the cloud. Second, we perform a systematical measurement on the
public cloud to understand how cloud vendors react to existing security threats.
Finally, we propose a novel technique to perform data reduction on audit data to
improve system capacity, and hence helping to enhance security in cloud.
In the power attack, we exploit various attack vectors in platform as a service
(PaaS), infrastructure as a service (IaaS), and software as a service (SaaS)
cloud environments. To demonstrate the feasibility of launching a power attack,
we conduct series of testbed based experiments and data-center-level
simulations. Moreover, we give a detailed analysis on how different power
management methods could affect a power attack and how to mitigate such an
attack. Our experimental results and analysis show that power attacks will pose
a serious threat to modern data centers and should be taken into account while
deploying new high-density servers and power management techniques.
In the measurement study, we mainly investigate how cloud vendors have
reacted to the co-residence threat inside the cloud, in terms of Virtual Machine
(VM) placement, network management, and Virtual Private Cloud (VPC).
Specifically, through intensive measurement probing, we first profile the dynamic
environment of cloud instances inside the cloud. Then using real experiments,
we quantify the impacts of VM placement and network management upon
co-residence, respectively. Moreover, we explore VPC, which is a defensive
service of Amazon EC2 for security enhancement, from the routing perspective.
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a serious cyber-threat, cloud vendors are
seeking solutions to “connect the suspicious dots” across multiple activities. This
requires ubiquitous system auditing for long period of time, which in turn causes
overwhelmingly large amount of system audit logs. We propose a new approach
that exploits the dependency among system events to reduce the number of log
entries while still supporting high quality forensics analysis. In particular, we first
propose an aggregation algorithm that preserves the event dependency in data
reduction to ensure high quality of forensic analysis. Then we propose an
aggressive reduction algorithm and exploit domain knowledge for further data
reduction. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation on real world auditing
systems using more than one-month log traces to validate the efficacy of our
approach.
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Understanding Security Threats in Cloud

Chapter 1

Introduction
As cloud computing has become increasingly popular, serious research efforts have been
paid for providing effective protection to these valuable resources inside a cloud, including
data and applications, as well as the associated cloud infrastructure. Like anti-malware,
cloud security is the cyber security arms race between cloud service vendors and malicious attackers. To deeply understanding the security issues inside a cloud, we need
to understand potential new vulnerabilities inside a cloud and how cloud service vendors
react to well-known security threats. Then, we can develop new techniques to enhance
security in a cloud environment and build more secure cloud systems.
This dissertation studies the security issues in a public cloud from three aspects. First,
we uncover a new threat called power attack in a cloud and investigate its feasibility and
induced damage. Then, we perform a systematical measurement on a public cloud to understand how cloud vendors react to security threats and investigate new attacks that will
break the defense line of a cloud. Finally, to enhance the security in a cloud, we propose
a new data reduction technique that can improve the system capacity in processing and
storing system audit logs significantly while supporting high quality forensic analysis.

2

1.1

Power Attack

With the ever-increasing demand of cloud services, data centers have experienced significant growth in their scale. The number of servers in data centers has surged from 24
million in 2008 to more than 35 million in 2012 [24]. Correspondingly, the power consumption of data centers has increased by 56 percent from 2005 to 2010 [66], with an
even faster speed in recent years. Thus, the rapid server deployment in data centers
has caused their power distribution and cooling systems to approach peak capacity [46].
However, it is very expensive to upgrade the power infrastructures of data centers and
the related cost is commonly in hundreds of millions of dollars.
To support more servers with the existing power infrastructures, power oversubscription has become a trend in data centers [42, 71, 60]. The key feature of oversubscription
is to place more servers on the power infrastructure of a data center than it can support
if all the servers would not reach their maximum power consumption at the same time.
Since servers rarely peak simultaneously with normal workloads, oversubscription allows
many more servers to be hosted than traditional provisioning that relies on the server
nameplate power ratings, without the need of upgrading the power infrastructure. However, power oversubscription makes it a possibility that the power consumption of servers
might exceed power capacity, resulting in an increasing risk of power outages.
From the security perspective, this hidden risk induced by power oversubscription
leaves data centers vulnerable to malicious workloads that can generate power spikes on
multiple servers at the same time. We define the generation of such a malicious workload
as a power attack. Without obtaining a privileged access, an attacker can launch a power
attack as a regular user. The simultaneously occurred power peaks could produce the
overloading of electrical circuits and then trigger the trip of circuit breakers (CBs) at the
rack level or even a higher level of power facilities, leading to undesired power outages.
The ultimate goal of a power attack is to fail the victim’s power facility and cause an
interruption or termination of the computing services running on the blackout servers. The
3

damage of a power attack is significant: both cloud service providers and the owners of
other computing services running on the blackout servers suffer from service interruptions
and financial losses.
In this dissertation, we systematically investigate the feasibility of launching power
attacks in three main-stream cloud service business models: platform as a service (PaaS),
infrastructure as a service (IaaS), and software as a service (SaaS), respectively. We also
demonstrate attack vectors in each scenario and propose potential mitigation methods.

1.2

A Measurement Study on Co-residence Threat inside the
Cloud

Entering the era of cloud computing, Infrastructure as a Service(IaaS) has become prevalent in providing Information Technology (IT) support. Large IT giants such as Amazon [1],
Microsoft [12], and Google have deployed large scale IaaS services for public usage. Employing IaaS, individual IT service providers no longer have to maintain their own computing infrastructures and achieve high reliability with low operation cost. However, IaaS
groups multiple third party services together into one physical pool, and sharing physical
resources with other customers could lead to unexpected security breaches such as sidechannel [99] and covert channel [89] attacks. It is well-known that IaaS is vulnerable to
the co-residence threat, in which two cloud instances (i.e., VMs) from different organizations share the same physical machine. Co-residence with the victim is the prerequisite
for mounting a side-channel or covert-channel attack.
The security issues induced by co-residence threat have been studied in previous
research. However, most previous works focus on “what an attacker can do” [74, 89, 99],
“what a victim user should do” [98], and “what a cloud vendor would do” [53, 100, 79]. In
contrast, to the best of our knowledge, this measurement work initiates the first attempt
to understand how cloud service vendors have reacted to co-residence threat in the past
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few years and explore potential new vulnerabilities of co-residence inside the cloud.
In this dissertation, we introduce our measurement study on co-residence threat in
IaaS cloud. In our measurement study, we mainly investigate how IaaS vendors have
reacted to this co-residence threat inside the cloud, in terms of VM placement, network
management, and Virtual Private Cloud (VPC). Specifically, through intensive measurement probing, we first profile the dynamic environment of cloud instances inside the cloud.
Then using real experiments, we quantify the impacts of VM placement and network management upon co-residence. Moreover, we explore VPC, which is a defensive service of
Amazon EC2 for security enhancement, from the routing perspective. On one hand, our
measurement shows that VPC is widely used and can indeed suppress co-residence
threat. On the other hand, we demonstrate a new approach to achieving co-residence
in VPC, indicating that co-residence threat still exists in the cloud. Finally, we propose
suggestions to enhance security in a public could environment.

1.3

High Fidelity Data Reduction for Big Data Security Dependency Analyses

In general it takes much more time for attackers to penetrate into a private cloud, to understand its infrastructure, to own the high-value targets, and to steal important information [2, 7, 9, 14, 15, 18] or to sabotage mission critical infrastructures [17]. However, compared with conventional attacks, these Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks usually
can inflict much more severe damage upon the cloud businesses. The recent DARPA
Transparent Computing (TC) program [19] emphasizes that the challenges of APT come
from modern computing systems being large, complex and opaque, and APTs can remain
undetected for years if individual steps are buried in background “noise”. Thus, to counter
sophisticated APT attacks, clouds are in great demand for solutions to “connect the dots”
across multiple activities that individually might not be suspicious enough. Even though
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APT attacks can be powerful and stealthy, one typical constraint from the attacker side
is that an APT attack needs multiple steps to succeed, such as infrastructure reconnaissance and target discovery, as illustrated in cyber kill chain [6]. Therefore, multiple attack
footprints might be left as “dots”.
In order to achieve the vision of connecting the dots, the first challenge is to collect
and store the dots (attack provenance). Since APT attackers have the potential to reach
each host, we need to monitor and collect attack provenance from every single host. According to [20], in 2014 APT attacks penetrated into enterprises and remained stealthy for
188 days on average and even years before launching harmful harvesting actions. This
implies, in order to detect and understand the impact of such attacks, the cloud vendors
need to keep a half year to one year worth of data. However, monitoring attack provenance on every host in a cloud for more than a half year is burdensome and laborious.
Just the system level audit data collected from Linux Audit system [11] or Window Event
Tracing framework [8] can easily reach 0.5 to 1GB per host. In a real world scenario, for a
commercial bank with 200,000 hosts, the required data is around 17PB (half year 0.5GB
per host) to 70PB (one year 1GB per host).
Furthermore, to achieve fast dependency correlation analysis or to promptly connect
the dots even interleaved with multiple normal activities, the data has to be efficiently
stored and indexed. Therefore, how to meet these storage and retrieval requirements
for such a big-data system is a daunting task. Very few previous research focuses on
how to mitigate the problem of overwhelmingly big-data of attack provenance derived
from system-level audit events for dependency analysis. LogGC [59] observes that some
system objects such as temporary files are isolated, have short life-span, and have little
impact on dependency analysis, so that such objects and events can be garbage collected
to save space.
In this dissertation, we take a different perspective and primarily study the impact of different events. We found that some events have identical dependency impact scope, and
therefore they can be safely aggregated. Based on this observation, we propose an algo6

rithm called Causality Preserved Reduction (CPR) for event aggregation. Furthermore,
we found that certain popular system behaviors lead to dense connected dependency
graphs of objects and their related neighbors. Thus, we devise a causality-preserving 1hop graph reduction technique called Process-centric Causality Approximation Reduction
(PCAR), which can further improve data reduction with very few false positives.

1.4

Overview

The rest of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents our research
efforts on studying a new security threat called power attack to a public cloud. Chapter 3
presents our measurement study on the on-going battles against the co-residence threat
in a public cloud. Chapter 4 presents our work to perform high fidelity data reduction for
big-data security dependency analyses that can help to enhance the security in a private
cloud by improving the efficiency of forensic analysis. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this
dissertation.
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Chapter 2

Power Attack: An Increasing Threat
to Data Centers
In this chapter, we propose a new attack called power attack and systematically investigate the feasibility of launching power attacks in three main-stream cloud service business
models: platform as a service (PaaS), infrastructure as a service (IaaS), and software as
a service (SaaS), respectively. In the case of PaaS, we choose high performance computing (HPC) as one of its typical workloads, and conduct a set of experiments based on
HPC benchmarks. We observe that an attacker can generate power spikes by adjusting workloads but those system-utilization-based load balancing mechanisms can hardly
detect such an attack. In the case of IaaS, we introduce a new concept called parasite
attacks that leverage controlled virtual machines (VMs) to significantly increase the power
consumption of the host physical machine. Moreover, we demonstrate that VM migration
can trigger high power spikes by conducting a set of experiments. If the VM migration
routine can be inferred by attackers, the power spikes generated during migration can
be exploited to help trip the CBs. In the case of SaaS, we use web services as its typical workload and conduct a set of experiments to demonstrate that specially crafted web
requests can trigger power spikes and consequently trip the CBs.
Based on our rack-level experimental results, we further conduct a series of data8

center-level simulations by using traces and configurations of the Google’s data center
at Lenoir, North Carolina, USA. The simulation results show that by injecting malicious
workload, an attacker can generate power spikes in a data center scale, which pose a
serious threat to the availability and reliability of data centers. While the focus of this
work is on the attacking side, we also present different approaches to mitigate the power
attacks in an effective manner.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.1 introduces the
background of power infrastructures in a data center. Section 2.2 presents our threat
model of power attacks. Sections 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 present how to launch a power attack
in the PaaS environments, IaaS environments, and SaaS environments, respectively.
Section 2.6 shows the data center level simulation results. Section 2.7 provides a detailed
discussion on how some new power management techniques will affect power attacks.
Section 2.8 presents the defense against power attacks. Section 2.9 surveys related
work, and finally Section 2.10 draws the conclusion.

2.1

Background

In this section, we introduce a typical power infrastructure employed in most data centers.
We then discuss the practice of power oversubscription in data centers for cost reduction
and its implications on the power security of data centers.
Today’s data centers commonly have a three-tier power distribution infrastructure to
support hosted computer servers [26], though the exact architecture may vary for different
sites. Figure 1 shows a simplified illustration of the three-tier hierarchy in a typical data
center. High-voltage power (60-400 kV) from the utility grid is scaled to medium voltage
(typically 10-20 kV) through an outside transformer and then fed to an Automatic Transfer
Switch (ATS). The ATS connects to both the utility power grid and on-site power (e.g.,
diesel) generators. From the ATS, the primary switchgear of the data center scales the
voltage down to 400-600 V, which is supplied to Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) via
9

Figure 2.1: A typical data center power distribution from [42]
multiple independent routes for fault tolerance. To protect the power infrastructure against
electrical faults, the switchgear is normally equipped with a circuit breaker (CB) that would
trip if the total power consumption of the data center exceeds its rated capacity. Each UPS
supplies a series of Power Distribution Units (PDUs), which are rated on the order of 75200 kW each. A PDU breaks up the incoming power feed into multiple branch circuits and
has a breaker panel where circuit breakers protect individual circuits from ground short
or power overload. The PDUs further transform the voltage to support a group of server
racks. It is important to note that many components in a data center power system have
limited capacities. For example, a PDU can generally handle 75-225 kW of load and a
rack-level branch circuit typically has a capacity of 6 kW [26]. Violating such capacities
may cause circuit breakers to trip, leading to the shutdown of the servers connected to a
branch circuit or even the entire data center. A typical 1 MW data center may house ten
or more PDUs. Each PDU can support approximately 20 to 60 racks while each rack can
include about 10 to 80 computer servers [86].
As mentioned before, many data centers keep deploying new high-density servers
(e.g., blade servers) to support their rapidly growing business. As a result, their power
10

distribution systems have already approached the peak capacity. In order to minimize
the high capital expenses of upgrading their power infrastructures, data centers recently
started to adopt power oversubscription as an important methodology to fully utilize their
existing power infrastructures [26]. For example, Google, HP, and IBM researchers have
proposed various ways to implement power oversubscription in data centers [42, 71, 60].
Google recently conducts analysis on three kinds of workload traces they collected from
real data centers: search, webmail, and MapReduce [42]. Their study shows that the
peak power is as high as 96% of the rated capacity at the rack level, but much lower
(72%) at the data center level, because the power consumption of different racks rarely
peak simultaneously. Therefore, they conclude that there is a substantial oversubscription opportunity, which would allow 38% more servers to be safely hosted in their existing
data center, without spending a huge amount of money to either upgrade the power infrastructure or build new data centers.
It is important to note that traditional data centers commonly adopt a conservative
provisioning methodology to host servers based on their nameplate power rating and
thus have very small probability for power overloading. However, today’s data centers
increasingly rely on power oversubscription to avoid or defer the costly power infrastructure upgrades, which significantly increases the opportunity of having undesired power
capacity violations.
As we can see, a strong assumption made for power oversubscription is that the power
consumption of most racks or PDUs in the data center never peak at the same time, which
has been demonstrated to be valid with normal data center workloads in numerous studies
(e.g., [26, 42, 47]). Unfortunately, an unsafe implementation of power oversubscription
could lead to a serious vulnerability for data centers, e.g., a malicious attacker may manipulate many servers to have their power peak simultaneously, which can then lead to the
violation of some rated power capacities in a data center. As a result, the overloading of
electrical circuits could trigger branch circuit breakers to trip, leading to undesired outages
and then the disruption of important services. To prevent undesired power overload, the
11

power consumption of each rack enclosure, each Power Distribution Unit (PDU), and the
entire data center must be carefully provisioned and then properly controlled at runtime, in
order to stay below the desired power limits at each level [86]. With the pervasion of outsourcing cloud services such as infrastructure as a service (IaaS), platform as a service
(PaaS) and software as a service (SaaS), the workload of the data center will be impacted
severely by the cloud service users. When all the users of cloud services are benign, the
workload of a data center will follow the normal pattern and power oversubscription can
be applied safely. However, an adversary can gain access to data center resources and
make changes to workload easily. By deliberately adjusting the workload of the servers
within a rack, an adversary can make all servers reach power peaks simultaneously and
the circuit breaker might be tripped. Moreover, a more advanced attacker may even generate power spikes in servers within same PDU or even UPS to cause higher level utility
failure.
In this dissertation, we will demonstrate how an adversary can generate power spikes
in three main-stream cloud business models, PaaS, IaaS and SaaS, respectively. Our
observations and experiments will prove that current power management strategies in a
data center will face the serious threat of a power attack.

2.2

Threat model

In this section, we describe the threat model of power attacks. In particular, we present
the reasonable assumptions we made for the study of power attacks.
The target of a power attack can be a rack, a PDU, or even the entire data center,
and we assume that the victim has the following configuration features. (1) The target is
running certain cloud services that are available to public. The target can run IaaS, PaaS
and SaaS, and any user including an attacker can subscribe the services. (2) The target
data center deploys power oversubscription as its power management solutions. (3) The
target data center monitors and manages power consumption at the rack or PDU level.
12

In a large data center, it is very difficult to monitor power consumption of all servers in
a very fine-grained manner. And the accurate power sampling for thousands or tens of
thousands servers will induce high overhead [68]. Therefore, power monitoring is at the
rack or PDU level, instead of the server level. (4) The target data center performs certain
routines such as virtual machine migration and deploys basic load balancing systems.
The adversary who launches a power attack could be an individual hacker, a botnet master, a competing cloud service provider, or an organization for committing cybercrime/cyberwarfare. However, we assume that the attacker is always from outside. The
resources and capabilities of the attacker has are detailed as follows. (1) The attacker
communicates with the target via the public service interface provided by the cloud. The
attacker accesses the target as a regular user, and no additional privilege is available to
the attacker. (2) The attacker has sufficient resources to launch a large scale attack. The
attacker has the capability of subscribing the target’s service with a large number of user
accounts and generating a large amount of malicious workload/requests to the target. (3)
The attacker can infer internal information of the target by exploiting certain probing techniques. Some network probing tools have been leveraged to infer the physical topology
of a data center [74], revealing the connection between the IP address of a machine and
its physical location, as well as verifying if two VMs reside in the same physical machine.
Moreover, for ease management, normally data center administrators place the servers
that provide the computing services for the same enterprise or group of users in the same
rack. Also, the IP addresses of the physical machines that connect to the same rack share
the same network ID and hence are close to each other. Therefore, we assume that the
attacker is able to approximately locate the target machines that are within the same rack
or PDU.
For instance, in Amazon EC2, the physical location of a VM can be associated with
the its type, “zone”, and IP address. An attacker can customize the VMs by specifying in
which zone the VM will be instantiated and what is the instance type so that the VM will
be located in a certain physical area. After the VM is booted, the attacker can further infer
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the “location” of the booted VMs as well as their host physical machines via IP address
and packet round time information [74]. Since the VM will change its IP address, i.e.,
its physical location every time it is rebooted, the attacker can place a VM to a target
machine or rack by keeping rebooting the VM until it reaches the desired location. In this
way, the attacker can deploy many VMs on those physical machines that are within the
same rack. On the other hand, as long as the attacker knows the IP address of a target, it
could simply launch a variant of mini-brute-force attack by injecting malicious workloads
to all the available servers within a certain range of the IP addresses, which cover most
of the machines within the same rack.
The process of launching a power attack is also the process of consuming the services
provided by the target, and the attacker must pay for the computing services. Thus, there
is a cost related to launch a power attack. However, the damage caused by a power attack
could be catastrophic. Once a CB is tripped, all servers connected will be blacked out and
all services running will be interrupted. Such a damage is much more severe than that
caused by traditional attacks such as DoS attacks. Therefore, for those attackers who
commit a cybercrime or cyberwarfare, we assume that they have a strong motivation and
rich resources to launch a power attack.
In different cloud environments, the attacker has different control over the target’s
computing resources and services. For instance, in IaaS, the attacker can obtain the full
control over owned virtual machines. But in SaaS, the attacker can only access the target
by issuing network requests. Therefore, the key technical challenge of launching a power
attack is how to construct effective attack vectors in different cloud environments, i.e.,
how to generate more power consumption of the target in different circumstances. In the
following three sections, we detail the attack vectors in three main-stream cloud business
models, PaaS, IaaS, and SaaS, respectively.
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Table 2.1: Configuration of servers used in experiments.
Server A
CPU

2*Xeon
W3540
Dual Core

Memory

2*1GB
DDR2

Hard Disk

Host OS
VMM

2.3

Server B
2*Xeon
5520
Quad
Core

Server C

Server D

Server E

Server F

Server G

2*Xeon
5130 Dual
Core

2*Intel
E4600

2*Intel
E4600

2*Xeon
Dual Core

2*Xeon
Dual Core

2*512MB
DDR,
6*1GB
DDR
1*7200
6*7200
4*7200
2*7200
2*7200
2*7200
RPM
RPM
RPM
RPM
RPM
RPM
SATA
SATA
SATA
SATA
SATA
SATA
Ubuntu
Ubuntu
Ubuntu
Ubuntu
Ubuntu
Ubuntu
12.10/3.5.0- 12.10/3.5.0- 12.10/3.5.0- 12.10/3.5.0- 12.10/3.5.0- 12.10/3.5.017 kernel
17 kernel
17 kernel
17 kernel
17 kernel
17 kernel
Xen 4.1.2
Xen 4.1.2
Xen 4.1.2
Xen 4.1.2
Xen 4.1.2
Xen 4.1.2
6*1GB
DDR3

4*1GB
DDR2

2*1GB
DDR2

2*1GB
DDR2

16*1GB
DDR2
2*7200
RPM
SATA
Ubuntu
12.10/3.5.017 kernel
Xen 4.1.2

Power Attack in PaaS

In this section, we investigate the attack vectors in PaaS environments and design corresponding experiments to evaluate the power attacks. Based on the experimental results,
we further conduct damage assessment and analysis.

2.3.1 PaaS and attack vectors
Platform as a Service (PaaS) provides computing platform to users. The service vendor
will manage the hard devices, OS, and middleware, but users can customize the applications running on the platform. With PaaS, application developers are able to save
considerable cost and complexity of running the underlying computing platforms.
In a PaaS environment, a user can run various applications flexibly on the platform, i.e.,
the user can get full control over the workload pattern. This feature of PaaS provides an
attacker the opportunity to launch a power attack. The attacker can subscribe the platform
from the service provider and run specially crafted workload. The malicious workload can
lead to a significant rise of power consumption.
Some PaaS providers [3] deploy load balancing mechanisms to prevent a workload
burst. A load balancing system normally monitors the system utilization of the servers and
dynamically schedules workload. However, load balancing is not equal to power balanc-
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ing. It is very hard to accurately model the power consumption of a machine with respect
to system utilization. With these characteristics of PaaS, we present a potential attack
vector as follows: an attacker can subscribe multiple servers that are within same rack
(connected by same breaker) from providers and run specially crafted applications/workload on them.
The attack workload should be designed to significantly increase the power consumption of victim servers in two phases. First, a heavy workload is generated to exercise
system utilization to a high level. This will directly increase the power consumption of victim servers. The system utilization should reach a certain cap under such a high workload,
e.g. the system utilization may reach the cap of load balancer or CPU utilization reaches
the 100% cap. In the second phase, after reaching system utilization cap, the workload
is no longer increased. Instead, the patterns or configurations of the workload will be
adjusted. Since different workload configurations yield different power consumptions, by
adjusting workload patterns or configurations, the power consumption of victim servers
will be further increased to a even higher level without increasing system utilization. In
this way, the target CB could be overloaded.

2.3.2 Attack evaluation
To evaluate the feasibility and effect of power attack in PaaS, we conduct experiments in
a testbed that simulates the PaaS environment. The configuration of all the servers used
in our experiments can be found in Table 2.1. While high performance computing (HPC)
has become a pervasive service nowadays, the demand of tremendous resources and
parallel computing makes HPC a suitable candidate of PaaS. Thus, we use HPC as the
workload of PaaS in our study.
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server with different SPECCPU workloads.
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Figure 2.3: Memory consumption of the
server with different SPECCPU workloads.

Single Server

First, we conduct single server experiments to figure out how different workloads may
affect the power consumption and system utilization of a server. The testbed of this round
of experiments is Server A in Table 2.1. SPECCPU2006 is used as the benchmark in
our experiments. SPECCPU2006 is a CPU intensive benchmark that is widely used as
HPC benchmark. There are different benchmarks in SPECCPU that perform different
computations. Since these benchmarks will yield different workload patterns, we can
regard them as different HPC applications running in PaaS environments.
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 illustrate power consumption and memory utilization of different
benchmarks in SPECCPU2006. These benchmarks are carefully selected so that they
consume similar amount of memory. Since our testbed has four cores, we run four copies
of SPEC benchmarks in parallel to fully exercise all cores. Since all benchmarks can exercise the CPU to reach the same utilization, we do not show CPU utilization in the figure.
As Figure 2.2 shows, different workloads yield very different power consumptions. Figure 2.3 illustrates the memory consumptions of these benchmarks. Note that SPECCPU
involves negligible disk and network activities, so their impact on power consumption is
insignificant and can be ignored.
As Figure 2.3 shows, while all these benchmarks induce the same CPU utilization,
benchmark 465 consumes the least memory. However, benchmark 465 consumes more
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power than many other benchmarks. For instance, while benchmark 462 consumes
around 150 W power, benchmark 465 has power spikes up to 175 W, which is over 15%
more than that of benchmark 462. We can also see that the memory consumption of
benchmark 462 and that of benchmark 456 are very close. The average memory utilization for 462 is 24%, while the average memory utilization for 456 is around 25%. With
the same CPU utilization, similar memory usage, and negligible I/O activity, we can regard that benchmark 462 and benchmark 456 consume very similar amount of system
resources. However, from Figure 2.2 we can see that benchmark 456 consumes over
20% more power than benchmark 465. Our observations indicate that system utilization,
i.e. resource consumption, cannot accurately determine power consumption.
We also run another HPC benchmark, High Performance Linpack (HPL) on the testbed.
HPL is a benchmark to calculate random matrix production. It has multiple parameters
to configure, which will affect the performance of the benchmark. In our experiments, we
take the following root parameters into consideration: the processor grid, i.e., the number
of processors, the problem size N which is the size of input matrix, and the block size
NB which determines how HPL solves the matrix production problem. Since our testbed
is a 4-core machine, we fix the number of processors to be 4. To make the input size
consistent, i.e. make HPL consume the same amount of memory, we fix the parameter
N as 9000. We adjust the value of NB among 200, 40, 20, and 1. As the CPU utilization
and memory utilization remain the same in these experiments, we do not present their
results here.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the power consumption of our testbed while running HPL with
different configurations. The adjusted parameter, NB, will determine the way HPL solves
the problem. From the figure we can see, with a different value of NB, the power consumption of our testbed differs significantly. When the block size is set to 1, the testbed
only consumes less than 150 W power. By contrast, the testbed has power consumption
near 190 W when the block size is set to 20. Such results indicate that even for the same
application, different parameters or configurations can yield considerably different power
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Figure 2.4: Power consumption of the server running HPL benchmark with different configurations.
consumption.

2.3.2.2

Rack-level Cluster

To verify if an attacker can generate significant power rise by adjusting the workload beyond a single server, we further conduct experiments in a rack-level cluster. We setup a
4-server rack with Server D, Server E, Server F, and Server G in Table 2.1. These four
servers are connected to the same switch and circuit breaker, resembling a rack in a real
world data center.
We run SPECCPU2006 on all servers in the rack. The overall power consumption
of the entire rack is recorded. These benchmarks are configured to exercise CPU to
full utilization (reaching the cap) and the memory usage percentage of each server on
these benchmarks are the same as those in our single-server experiments. Therefore,
we only present the results of power consumption at the rack level, which are illustrated
in Figure 2.5.
As Figure 2.5 shows, the rack level results concur with our single server results. While
the CPU utilizations in all cases reach the cap, some benchmarks generate more power
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Figure 2.5: Power consumption of the rack while running different benchmarks from
SPECCPU.
consumption than others. Such an observation indicates that even after the system utilization reaches a cap, an attacker has the potential to increase the power consumption of
target by adjusting the workload, e.g., the attacker can change the workload from benchmark 462 to benchmark 456 to further increase power consumption.
Then we design two malicious traces to launch a power attack against a rack in PaaS
environments. The first trace is based on SPECCPU2006. At the beginning, the workload behaves as a normal workload that generates moderate system utilization and power
consumption. We use benchmark 462 with light workload configuration to represent such
a moderate workload. Next, the attacker can change the workload to exercise the system
utilization to a certain level to significantly increase power consumption. We use benchmark 462 with heavy workload to represent the malicious workload during this phase.
Finally, after system utilization reaches the cap, the attacker tunes the workload to further
increase power consumption. Here we use benchmark 456 to represent the malicious
workload of this phase.
The second malicious trace is based on High Performance Linpack (HPL). While
SPECCPU2006 can be used as running independent workloads on different machines,
we use HPL to simulate the scenario where multiple servers are coordinated to run the
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Figure 2.6: Power consumption of the rack under power attack.
same task in PaaS. Each of the four servers works as a node in the working cluster and
they communicate with each other via OpenMPI. HPL will distribute the workload to each
node for high performance computation. In this round of experiments, we configure HPL
with different problem sizes (N) and different block sizes (NB). The power attack based
on HPL is mounted as follows. Fist, the input size of the workload is set to be moderate,
we use HPL with N set to 1000 and NB set to 5 to represent the moderate workload.
Next, the attacker can enlarge the input size to increase the system utilization. In our
experiments, we increase the block size to 4000 during this phase and more CPU cores
are exercised. At last, the attacker can change the workload pattern to further increase
power consumption. In our case, we modify NB from 5 to 100.
The evaluation results of the malicious workload are illustrated in Figure 2.6. It is
evident that both malicious traces can generate a significant rise in the overall power
consumption of the rack. As Figure 2.6 shows, the power attack can trigger over 30%
increase in power consumption.

21

2.3.3 Damage assessment and analysis
Our experimental results above validate that in PaaS environments, an attacker can generate abnormal high power consumption by adjusting workload running on target machines.
The damage caused by such a power attack is at two levels. A relatively light damage can be overheating the IT equipments and degrading the performance of the victim
servers. During our experiments, when launching a power attack against the rack with
our malicious traces, the CPU cores of server E were overheated, resulting in system
failure. In a rack where power is aggressively oversubscribed, a power attack can lead
to more serious consequence: the trip of circuit breaker (CB). The 4-machine rack used
in our experiments is located in a server room with the total number of 16 servers. The
entire server room can be regarded as a PaaS rack, where all servers are connected by
the same CB. Users can run different applications on the servers in the room and only
the four servers in our small rack are under our control. When we conducted experiments
that run the SPECCPU 456 benchmarks, the CB of the server room was tripped. This
accident indicates that power attacks can be a serious threat in real world.
However, our experimental results do not stand for the most powerful power attack
in real world. First, the HPC benchmarks we used are only CPU-intensive. The memory and I/O devices are not fully exercised in our experiments, leaving space for further
increase of power consumption. In real world, an attacker can include memory and I/O
intensive workloads to further increase power consumption. Second, the servers used in
our experiments have poor power proportionality. These servers consume over 60% of
peak power when being idle. Such poor power proportionality will significantly reduce the
effects of power attack because there is not much room for the increase of power consumption. In real world, a power attack against data centers with more advanced servers
should be able to produce more significant impacts than our experimental results.
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2.4

Power Attack in IaaS

This section describes the potential attack vectors in the IaaS environment and presents
the experimental results and analysis of evaluation on two attack vectors: parasite attack
and VM migration.

2.4.1 IaaS and attack vectors
Known as infrastructure as a service, IaaS is a cloud-service model in which the provider
offers physical or virtualized infrastructure along with other resources to users. Amazon’s
Elastic Cloud (EC2) is a popular IaaS service. In the EC2 environment, a user can instantiate virtual machines (VMs) via the interface or API provided by EC2. The booted
VMs are under full control of the user. In other words, while the service vendor manages
the hypervisor and physical devices, the user can determine the OS, middleware, application and data running on the VMs. IaaS provides a cost-effective way for enterprises
to modernize and expand their IT capabilities without spending capital resources on infrastructure. However, IaaS-based data centers are also exposed to the threat of power
attack.
First of all, the IaaS business model allows an attacker to have more control over
the target. The attacker can instantiate many VMs with minor cost and run any kind of
workloads on the VMs.
Second, IaaS divulges a considerable amount of internal data center information to
the attacker. For the convenience in management, an IaaS data center often uses some
well-known topology and networking configuration strategies [74]. Thus, the attacker can
infer the internal structure of the data center and locate the target inside the data center
via network probing.
Third, the widely used virtualization techniques in IaaS expose performance vulnerability to malicious attackers. In particular, the additional layer introduced by virtualization
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makes many system activities such as I/O operations more costly. The induced high
overhead can be exploited by attackers to generate power spikes.
Based on these vulnerabilities of IaaS, we propose two attack vectors to launch a
power attack in IaaS environments.
The first attack vector is parasite attack that leverages controlled VMs to attack the
host physical machine from inside, resembling a parasite consuming its host from inside. On one hand, the controlled VMs can directly run intensive workloads to increase
the power consumption of the host. On the other hand, the controlled VMs can exploit
the vulnerability of virtualization to further abuse more resources and power of the host
system. For instance, DoS attacks towards a parasite VM can consume considerable resources of the hypervisor [75], potentially increasing the power consumption of the host.
Using these two attack strategies together, a parasite attack can significantly increase the
power consumption of a target system.
The second vector is VM migration that is a routine operation in the cloud. Certain VMs
require live migration to perform maintenance and update. VM migration is a high power
consuming operation. If an attacker can understand how VM migration is performed in an
IaaS data center, VM migration can be exploited to help launch a power attack. Knowing
that a number of VMs are being migrated to a rack, the attacker can launch a power attack
like a parasite attack against the rack at the same time period. Since VM migration itself
can cause high power spikes, it will greatly aggravate the power attack and cause the trip
of CB.

2.4.2 Evaluation of parasite attack
The complete process of a parasite attack is as follows. First the attacker keeps instantiating VMs and infers their physical locations with the strategies mentioned above. In this
way, the attacker can finally place many VMs on the physical machines within a target
rack. Then, the attacker can run intensive workloads on the controlled VMs to increase
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Figure 2.7: Power consumption of the server under parasite attack
the power consumption of the host systems. During this phase, the parasites fully consume the resources that are allocated to them by the hosts. Finally, the attacker can
launch some special attacks, e.g., DoS attacks towards the parasite VMs. Since the parasite VMs are under full control of the attacker, an attack towards parasites can ensure
a success. Due to the performance penalty of virtualization, such an attack can trigger
unexpected system activities at the hypervisor level, leading to resource abuse of the
host system. As a result, the power consumption of the entire host system can be further
increased to a higher level.
To evaluate the feasibility of a parasite attack, we build up a virtualized system with
multiple VMs and launch attacks against one of the VMs. The host machine is Server B in
Table 2.1. We run 4 virtual machines over the host, including the ”parasite VM” controlled
by the attacker. These VMs are installed with Ubuntu 12.10 and they are configured
with 512 MB memory and 4 vcpus. The open-source tool hping3 is used to launch DoS
attacks. Three different types of DoS attacks are launched: TCP SYN flood, Smurf, and
LAND attacks. The power consumption of the host machine is recorded.
At the beginning, all these 4 VMs are running certain workloads so that their system
utilizations remain around 25%, which is normal in real world. Under this scenario, the
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host consumes around 180 W of power. In the next step, we run intensive workload on
the VM controlled by the attacker. With the parasite VM being fully exercised, the power
consumption of the host is increased to around 200 W. Then, we launch DoS attacks
against the parasite VM. Under DoS-based parasite attacks, the power consumption of
the host is increased to above 230 W, with power spikes that can reach 245 W. The
experimental results are shown in Figure 2.7, and they clearly demonstrate that parasite
attacks can increase the power consumption of the host by over 30%.

2.4.3 Exploiting VM migration
Since users have more control over VMs and more internal information is available in
IaaS, VM migration can be exploited to help launch a power attack in IaaS. To measure the
power consumption spikes generated during a VM migration, we conduct three rounds of
experiments. First, a basic VM migration is conducted to verify that for a server involved in
the migration, it will experience a power rise. In the second round, the scenario where VMs
are migrated within a rack is emulated to show the impact of intra-rack VM migration on
the overall power consumption of a rack. Finally, we emulate the scenario where multiple
VMs are simultaneously migrated from other racks to a target rack to demonstrate the
threat caused by inter-rack VM migration.
In the first round of experiments, Server B and Server C in Table 2.1 are used as our
testbed. The VMs running on the servers are initialized with 512MB memory, 8G image
size, 4 vcpus and default credits (512). We set server B as the monitored server whose
power consumption will be recorded. We first set server B as the destination server,
migrating 1 idle VM from server C to server B. Then we set server B as the source server,
migrating 1 idle VM from it to server C.
Figure 2.8 illustrates the power consumption of the monitored server. The figure
demonstrates that during the migration, as either the source or the destination, the server
will experience a rise of power consumption. The cause of a short period of power spike is

26

210

Power (W)

Migration
Ends

Migration
Begins

200
190
180
170
160

Migrate out
Migrate in
0

5

10

15

20

25

Time (s)

Figure 2.8: Power consumption of an involved server during VM migration.
the initialization and operation of VM migration. At the source side, the memory contents
need to be duplicated; additional computation is required to prepare the transition; and
networking devices are also exercised to transfer VM information. At the destination side,
additional resources are allocated to the new incoming VM, increasing the server’s power
consumption.
In the second round, we emulate the intra-rack VM migration as following. We connect
Server A, Server B, and Server C to the same circuit breaker, making up an IaaS rack.
We boot 8 VMs in each of the 3 servers with the SPECCPU benchmarks running on them.
In this round of migration, we migrate 4 VMs from server A to server B, 4 VMs from server
B to server C, and 4 VMs from server C to server A.
The power consumption of the entire rack during the migration is illustrated in Figure 2.9. We can see that there are several crests of power consumption. This is due
to the different configurations of the servers in our testbed. Although all the migrations
are started at the same time, different configurations lead to different migration time and
different power consumption. These results indicate that when multiple VMs are migrated
together as in our experiments, the rack will experience some unexpected power spikes.
In our experiments, the rack has already been working in a high power consumption state.
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Figure 2.9: Power consumption of the rack during intra-rack VM migration.
During the migration, the power consumption of the rack further rises from 560 W to 640
W. The power spikes over 600 W last for over 15 seconds. Suppose the CB of the rack
has a rated power capacity of 600 W, as the power consumption of the rack is below 560
W both before and after migration. If the migration strategies do not take the migration
power spikes into a serious account [36, 77], the power spikes will trip the CB of the rack,
resulting in disastrous server shutdowns.
In the third round, we emulate the inter-rack VM migration. In real world data centers,
it is common that a number of virtual machines are migrated simultaneously, probably
towards the same rack. For example, periodic live VM migration has been commonly
adopted as an effective way to perform server consolidation for higher resource utilizations
in data centers [81, 82]. In our experiments, we set server B in a separate rack and set
servers A and C in the other racks. Therefore, the power consumption of server B is
recorded as the power consumption of the target rack. We migrate 2 VMs from server A
to server B and another 2 VMs from server C to server B in parallel. Server B originally
runs 4 VMs with the SPECCPU workload and all the VMs that are migrated to server B
also run SPECCPU on them.
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Figure 2.10: Power consumption of the target rack during inter-rack VM migration
Figure 2.10 illustrates the power consumption of the target rack during the migration.
At the beginning, the target rack has power consumption around 225 W. When the migration begins, the power consumption of the target begins to rise rapidly. Within a short
period, the target can reach a power peak over 280 W. After the migration ends, the power
consumption of the target rack reduces to around 260 W. Such results indicate that if there
are multiple VMs migrated to one rack simultaneously, the target rack will experience significant power spikes and such power spikes can be exploited by an attacker to trip the
CB of the target rack.

2.4.4 Damage assessment and discussion
Our experimental results verify the feasibility of launching a power attack in IaaS. With one
parasite VM residing in the host, a parasite attack can increase the power consumption
of a virtualized system by more than 30%. Such an attack is as powerful as the attack
in PaaS. In real world, the parasite attack effect can be higher than what we achieved
in the experiments since the attacker is able to place more than one parasite VMs on
a target. More parasite VMs imply that more controlled VMs on the host run in full uti-
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lization, generating more power consumption. In addition, more parasite VMs can also
make DoS attacks more powerful. As Figure 2.7 shows, Smurf attack incurs more power
consumption than TCP SYN flood and LAND attacks. The reason is that TCP SYN flood
and LAND attacks can only affect one victim VM, but Smurf attack broadcasts packets to
a range of IP addresses and makes VMs communicate with each other, which can affect
multiple VMs. Thus, if the attacker is able to launch DoS attacks to multiple parasite VMs,
the impact of a power attack upon the host will be more significant.
In addition to parasite attacks, we also demonstrate that VM migration can be exploited
to help launch a power attack. Although attackers can hardly directly manipulate the VM
migration routine in a data center, they can infer how and when VM migration is conducted
and launch a power attack against the rack that is conducting VM migration. As our
experimental results demonstrate, VM migration can increase the power consumption of a
rack by over 30% even when the rack is already imposed with heavy workload. Therefore,
launching a power attack against a rack conducting VM migration can amplify the damage
caused the power attack and trip the CB more easily. VM migration can also be leveraged
to help mount a power attack in PaaS and SaaS environments, where virtualization and
VM migration are used.

2.5

Power Attack in SaaS

With SaaS being the most popular cloud service model, we exploit the attack vectors in
SaaS scenarios and conduct a set of experiments to verify their feasibility.

2.5.1 SaaS and attack vectors
Software as a service (SaaS) delivers the application managed by third-party vendors
to cloud clients, and users can access the applications via client-side interfaces. The
most typical SaaS service is web service. Compared with PaaS and IaaS, the users of
SaaS have much less control over the infrastructure. The service vendor manages the
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underlying hardware, middleware, OS and applications, which are transparent to users.
A user can access the application only via the interfaces provided. Therefore, standing at
the perspective of power attacker, SaaS provides very limited control over the target. The
attacker can only access the target via certain APIs or interfaces (usually web browser).
However, as pointed out by many previous works, certain specially crafted web service
requests will consume more system resources, therefore resulting in the potential of a
power attack.
In a typical web service, HTML pages are dynamically generated when receiving requests. Some contents of the requested web page need to be constructed on the fly
or fetched from database. During this process, two levels of caching, object cache and
in-memory cache, are used to help to optimize the performance. Normally many cache
misses can produce considerable negative impact on the system performance and lead
to the increase of power consumption. Thus, an attacker will attempt to generate requests
that trigger a large number of cache misses to launch a power attack.
Moreover, different computation will induce different power consumption for a system.
For instance, floating point operations may consume more power consumption than integer operations. In modern processors such as x86 processors, Arithmetic Logic Unit
(ALU) performs integer operations while the Floating-Point Unit (FPU) takes the responsibility of executing floating point operations. FPU is more power hungry than ALU, indicating that floating point operations are more power expensive than integer operations.
Meanwhile, different arithmetic computation will consume different amount of resources
as well, e.g., division operation is more costly than add and multiplication operations.
Such power consumption discrepancy in computation provides another attack vector. An
attacker can launch a power attack by sending requests that involve a large number of
expensive floating point operations.
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2.5.2 Attack evaluation
To evaluate a power attack in SaaS environments, we set up a testbed to deploy web
services and conduct a series of experiments to generate power spikes. The server used
in the evaluation is Server B in Table 2.1.
The RUBiS benchmark is used in our evaluation. RUBiS is a web benchmark that emulates online-shopping web services. RUBiS provides various features of classic online
shopping websites such as browsing goods, selling items, bidding on items, registration
and viewing user information. Meanwhile, RUBiS also provides client emulators that behave as real world users. The “transition table” defined by RUBiS describes the behaviors
of the emulated clients. By modifying the transition table, the client emulator can generate
different request patterns.
We deploy RUBiS as a 3-tier web service, in which Apache 2, Tomcat7, and MySQL
are used as the web server, the application server, the database, respectively. We populate the database with 100,000 unique items and 50,000 different users. To Make RUBiS
more suitable for our experiments, we modify the source code of RUBiS to include some
additional functionalities. For instance, we make RUBiS capable of performing “discount”
operations, i.e., a user can have coupons to get discount, reducing the buy-out prices of
items by certain percentage. The users can purchase multiple items or a certain number
of one item, and RUBiS will calculate the overall price. We also modify the client emulator
to make it more flexible and capable of generating specially crafted requests.
In our experiments, we first explore the requests that will trigger cache misses. RUBiS
provides a “default” transition table that defines the normal traffic, so we use it to represent
the normal workload of RUBiS. During the experiments, 4,000 clients are emulated. To
generate the malicious cache-miss traffic, we modify the transition table so that the clients
will continuously browse items in a totally random manner. In this way, both of the object
caches and in-memory caches will be flushed frequently, resulting in considerable cache
misses. Figure 2.11 shows the comparison of power consumption between normal traf-
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Figure 2.11: Power consumption of the server under normal workload and cache miss
workload
fic and cache-miss traffic. The results demonstrate that cache-miss traffic can generate
significantly more (over 15%) power consumption than normal traffic.
We also conduct experiments to verify that floating point operations generate more
power consumption than integer operations. First, we populate the database to set the
prices of all items to be integer numbers. Then we emulate 4,000 clients to browse and
purchase items with the access pattern provided by the default transition table. Such
requests represent the normal workload of the web service. After that, we update the
prices of all items to be floating point numbers. While the requests still follow the access
pattern provided by the default transition table, the clients are crafted to purchase multiple
items and use coupons while checking out. Such malicious requests cause the server to
perform a considerable amount of floating point operations. The experimental results are
illustrated in Figure 2.12. Compared with the normal workload, it is evident that those
malicious requests generating a large number of floating point operations can force the
web server to experience a significant rise of power consumption.
Finally, we combine the two attack vectors mentioned above to generate a malicious
trace and then launch a more powerful attack. Again, we use the trace of 4,000 emu33
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Figure 2.12: Power consumption of the server under floating point operation intensive
workload
lated clients generated by the default transition table to represent a normal workload of
the server. To launch the attack, we craft the malicious requests to trigger both cache
misses and expensive floating point operations. While running the normal workload, we
launch the power attack by injecting crafted requests from 2,000 malicious clients. These
malicious clients perform browse-and-purchase operations. Each of the malicious client
first browses random goods with floating point prices, then purchases a random number
of the browsed items. Meanwhile, the client uses coupons to get discount on the items
bought. In this way, the server has to perform numerous add, multiplication and division
floating point operations. Moreover, since the clients are browsing and purchasing items
in a random fashion, a large number of cache misses are triggered. Figure 2.13 illustrates
the power consumption of the victim server under the power attack, which is mounted at
180s. The results clearly demonstrate that our power attack can induce a significant rise
in power consumption of servers in SaaS environments.
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Figure 2.13: Power consumption of the server under power attack.

2.5.3 Damage assessment and discussion
Our experimental results verify that specially crafted web requests can generate significantly more power consumption of servers in SaaS than normal requests. In our SaaS
experiments, the power attack can increase the power consumption of a victim server by
30 to 40 percent, which is even more significant than those in PaaS and IaaS environments. Therefore, the damage caused by a power attack in SaaS can be as great as in
PaaS and IaaS. In general, the attack impact upon SaaS mainly depends on three factors,
the per-request power consumption, the malicious request rate, and the attack duration.
To make an attack powerful and stealthy, seeking an attack vector with high per-request
power consumption is the key.
Besides the attack vectors mentioned above, certain web applications expose particular vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers. For instance, an attacker can
launch algorithmic complexity attacks [39] against web applications that involve with many
hash table operations. Algorithmic complexity attacks can make hash table operations always suffer from the worst case complexity, therefore consuming much more resources.
For web applications deployed with large databases, requests that compete on database
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Table 2.2: Simulation Environment Setup.
Parameter
# of Servers
# of racks
# of PDU
# of CBs
Capacity of PDU-level CB
Capacity of DC-level CB
CPU Per Server
DRAM Per Server
Disk Per Server
Est. Peak Power per Server

Value
139,200
approximate 700
approximate 20
approximate 30 (per PDU + per DC )
150kW
1MW
dual-core 2.0GHz Xeon
16GB
2TB
240Watt

locks can also generate significantly more resource consumption [70].

2.6

Datacenter Level Simulation

While we have shown the feasibility of mounting a power attack at the server and rack
levels, such attacks could be spawned to the data center level, which may lead to more severe and disastrous consequences. In this section, we study the impact of power attacks
at the data center level (DC-level) including the large size PDU-level based on simulations. We first introduce the setup of simulations and then present the simulation results
and analysis.

2.6.1 Simulation Setup
2.6.1.1

Platform

Based on our server-level and rack-level experimental results, we build the simulation
models and configure the data center parameters following the description of the Google
data center in Lenoir, North Carolina, USA [40]. We assume there exists a simple workload management scheme in the data center, which can distribute all workloads to each
PDU evenly. All simulation parameters and their values are shown in Table 2.2.
36

35,000

Peak

Workload Trace
(Query Per Second)

30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000

Medium

10,000
5,000

Valley

0
Mon
0:00

Mon
6:00

Mon Mon
12:00 18:00

Tue
0:00

Tue
6:00

Tue
Tue
12:00 18:00

Wed
0:00

Wed
6:00

Wed Wed Thu
12:00 18:00 0:00

Time

Figure 2.14: The workload trace of a three-day period in May 2011 from the Google
cluster in [40].
In the simulation, we build the similar power infrastructure as in Figure []. Based on
our threat model, a power attacker can obtain the knowledge of racks and servers in the
same PDU to launch attacks to each single PDU inside the power infrastructure. We use
a boolean checker as the CB in the simulation implementation. Once a PDU-level CB is
tripped, servers connected to the corresponding branch circuit shut down consequently.
As a result, we can observe that the monitored victim PDU power drops down to zero.
All services dispatched to servers in this PDU will be redistributed to other servers with
stable power supply from different PDUs. A similar CB is implemented for the whole data
center. From the public information of the Google data center, we find that the nameplate
capacity of the DC-level CB is smaller than the sum of all capacity of PDU-level CBs. The
reason is due mainly to the unplanned capacity increase of the Google DC (adding more
servers and PDUs) without updating the whole power infrastructure. Thus, there exists a
possibility that the DC-level CB could be tripped without failing any PDU-level CBs, which
is confirmed by our simulation results shown in Figure 2.17.

2.6.1.2

Workloads

Two workload traces are used in our simulation, named as “Original” and “Attack” representing normal and attack activities, respectively. The original trace consists of the daily
workloads of the Google data center [40]. The attack trace includes the workloads similar
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to HPC workloads, which can increase the power consumption of a target by up to 30%1
in a short time. As a sample of the daily workload, we show a three-day workload trace
from Google in Figure 2.14. Note that, in Figure 2.14, we define three regions as peak,
medium, and valley, with respect to the workload dynamics. The peak region is above the
top 10-percentile of the workload, e.g., the workload density of 30,000 queries per second (qps) is the top 4-percentile of the workload. By contrast, the valley region is below
the 90-percentile of the workload. The rest in between is the medium region. The three
regions represent the three typical running states of a data center, busy, normal, and idle.
We design simulations that launch the power attacks in these three regions, respectively,
to examine the power attack impact at the DC level under different running states of the
data center.

2.6.2 Simulation results
Prior to the simulation of the DC level power attacks, we first simulate the power attacks
at the PDU level to demonstrate the impact of power attacks on a victim PDU and how
PDU level attacks can affect the power consumption of the entire data center.
When an attacker acquires the information of those servers located in the same PDU,
the attacker can launch a power attack against this PDU to trigger a power outage. We
simulate this scenario where the power attacker targets several particular PDUs. The
capacity of the PDU-level CB is shown in Table 2.2.
First, we show a snapshot of the power attack on a large size PDU (including 40 racks,
650 machines) in Figure 2.16. The attack begins at time 12min and lasts for 22 minutes
till the PDU-level CB is tripped. The whole PDU fails and all the servers powered by this
PDU are shut down completely. Thus, compared with the power behavior of the original
workloads, the power consumption of the PDU drops immediately after the success of the
power attack. In our simulation, we have performed four similar power attack attempts
to four different PDUs sequentially at the scale of a data center. The results are shown
1

The number is based on our experimental results in Sections IV,V, andVI.
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Figure 2.15: The snapshot of continuous power attacks on multiple PDUs in the scale of
data center. There are multiple attacks launched at time between 9-10(1st), 24-25(2nd),
43-44(3rd) and 49-50(4th).
in Figure 2.15, in which each attack is represented as an arrow and the first arrow is the
attack shown in Figure 2.16.
All attacks successfully trip the targeted PDU-level CBs. However, the power curve of
the entire data center recovers shortly after the first three attacks. This is because when
one PDU fails, the workload manager in DC restarts and evenly redistributes those workloads from the servers lost power to other servers with stable power supply. Thus, the
impact of PDU-level power attacks is reduced at a certain degree at the cost of power load
increase in other PDUs. However, after the fourth attack in 49-50 hour, the computing
capacity of whole data center (i.e., the number of available servers) is greatly diminished
due to the power outages. The remainder of available servers cannot support the significant increase of original workload density starting at 58th hour, regardless of the workload
management. Thus, the load balancer of the data center starts to reject service requests
and the rejection ends till 69th hour. During this period of time (i.e., from 58th to 69th
hours), only about 53% of service requests are processed and the rest are rejected. As a
result, the DC-level power consumption is just half of the original amount, which is clearly
shown in the area of the oscillating power curve in Figure 2.15. The entire data center
finally resumes to normal between 69th and 70th hours with the significant decrease of
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Figure 2.16: The snapshot of power attack on one PDU. This is the first attack shown in
the scale of data center as in Fig. 2.15.
workload supply.
Next, we target at tripping the DC-level CB. As aforementioned, it is possible that the
DC-level CB is tripped without the trip of any PDU-level CBs. Here we illustrate three
power attacks that target at the DC-level CB in three workload regions, respectively, in
Figure 2.17. When DC is processing workloads in the peak region, it is defenseless to the
30% power increase, as shown in Figure 2.17(a). Although the impact of the power attack
is mitigated by the load balancer at some degree, the margin to the power threshold of
the DC-level CB is very small. As a result, the whole data center quickly fails under the
power attack. For the power attack in the medium region, in Figure 2.17(b), we observe
the similar results. Especially, when the original workload increases uphill and still in the
medium region, the power attack successfully shuts down the entire data center. However, unlike the power attack in the peak region, there exist possibilities that power attacks
could fail in this region as the total power consumption (i.e., Original+Attack) is smaller
than the capacity of the DC-level CB. Attackers could either increase the size of attack
workloads (at a risk of being discovered by the data center administrators) or find the right
time to launch such an attack again. For the power attack in the valley region, due to the
same reason as the failed attack attempts in the medium region, we have not succeeded
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Figure 2.17: Power attack launched at the DC level in three regions, (a) peak, (b) medium,
and (c) valley. Each red arrow in (c) represents one power attack attempt.
in triggering a power outage in the DC with the same malicious workloads. Although not
all power attempts lead to power outages of the target, our simulation shows two observations: (1) there is a noticeable possibility of a power attack success at the data center
level, especially at peak times, which leads to disastrous consequences. (2) The damage
of power attacks could be weakened by pre-defined DC management policies to some
extent. Next, we discuss those results in details.
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Table 2.3: Attack Statistics.
Scenario
DC_Peak
DC_Medium
DC_Valley
PDU_Peak
PDU_Medium
PDU_Valley

Infected Machines
139200
139200
139200
231
445
698

Attack Duration (min)
27
182
N/A 2
13
16
17

2.6.3 Damage assessment and discussion
Our simulation results further demonstrate the potential threat of power attacks. For example, the PDU-level simulation shows that a power attack can trip the CB at the PDU
level. The data center-level simulation demonstrates that a power attack could potentially
shut down the entire data center. Table 2.3 lists some statistics of all the simulated power
attacks. The attack against the entire data center succeeds when the workload is in the
peak and medium regions, but fails in the valley region. Moreover, the power attack in
the medium region takes several attempts and lasts longer than that in the peak region,
due to the workload management policies commonly employed in a data center, such as
load balancing. It is important to note that such management policies are not originally
designed to defend against power attacks, though they could slightly weaken the impacts
of a power attack only to a limited degree. On the other hand, from an attacker’s perspective, our results suggest that a power attack is more effective when the data center
workload is in the peak region. Since the workload traces of many data centers are accessible to the public and usually follow a well-known diurnal pattern, it is not difficult for
the attacker to figure out when it is the best time to launch an effective power attack.
Comparing the number of accessible servers and the attack duration (Table 2.3) at
both the DC and PDU levels, it is obvious that a power attack requires less resources at a
lower (i.e., the PDU) level. To attack a rack or all racks in a PDU, the attacker only needs
to access a moderate number of servers. However, the attacker would need to have the
knowledge that those servers are located within the target rack/PDU. On the contrary, to
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launch a power attack against the entire data center, the attacker does not need to know
such location information. In our simulation at the DC level, we assume that all the servers
are accessible to the attacker. However, in the real world, such an assumption may not be
true. For example, some servers in a data center may be disconnected from the Internet
or have some strong security protection, so the attacker cannot gain the access to them.
However, as discussed in previous sections, a 30% power increase is not the greatest
amount of increase a power attack can generate. Therefore, even if a power attacker
can only access just a portion of servers within a PDU or a data center, it is still possible
that the overall power consumption would be increased by about 30%, leading to the
disastrous server shutdowns.

2.7

Impact of New Power Management Solutions

In this section, we discuss the impacts of some new power management strategies on
power attack. Although these strategies have not yet been widely deployed, it is highly
likely that they could be employed in future data centers. Some of the strategies may
mitigate the threat of power attack while the others may increase the risk.

2.7.1 Power capping
Power capping is a solution that can limit the maximum power consumption of a target unit within a user-specified power cap in a data center. For example, server-level
power capping [61] leverages feedback control theory to limit the power consumption of a
server. Similarly, the power consumption of multiple servers in a rack or PDU can also be
capped [71, 72, 85]. For an entire data center, a hierarchical power control solution called
SHIP [86] has been proposed to provide power capping hierarchically at three different
levels: rack, PDU, and the whole data center. For all those power capping strategies, the
power consumption of the target is monitored periodically in real time and dynamically
controlled to ensure that it stays below the specified power cap. For instance, Dynamic
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Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) is commonly used to lower the CPU frequencies
(and voltage) of selected servers when the current power consumption is higher than the
cap. In the meantime, within the cap, power capping tries to run the servers at their highest possible frequencies for optimizing system performance. Power capping can also
allow a data center operator to host more servers (i.e., power oversubscription), without
upgrading the power infrastructure, by having a power cap that is just slightly lower than
the rated capacity of the corresponding CB.
Power capping can definitely help to defend against power attack, because power attack is to generate power spikes while power capping is to shave power spikes. However,
in practice, there are three major challenges that prevent power capping from becoming
an effective defense solution: reactive manner, the selection of control period, and long
settling time. First, power capping works in a reactive manner because its periodic power
sampling determines that it can only respond to any power budget violation. Any power
spikes occur between two consecutive power sampling points (i.e., within a control period)
cannot be detected by power capping. Since the control period can be as long as several
minutes at the data center level [86], a power attacker can easily launch an attack successfully before power capping can even detect it. Second, in power capping, the selection of
control period is a trade-off between system responsiveness and computation/communication overheads. A power capping controller needs to periodically collect the power and
performance information from all the controlled servers through the data center network,
make centralized and computational-intensive capping decisions, and then send the decisions back to the servers to change their hardware DVFS levels for power capping. A
control period has to be long enough for all those steps to finish. Therefore, the control
period can be longer than 2 minutes for the SHIP hierarchical controller [86]. However,
2 minutes is already long enough for a CB to trip even when it has only a 25% power
overload [43]. As shown in our hardware experiments, a 30% or higher power rise can be
easily generated by an attacker through various ways such as parasite attack. Finally, a
power capping controller normally cannot immediately drag the power consumption lower
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than the CB capacity within one control period, even if it detects a power attack. Most controllers need a settling time of at least six or more control periods [86], which means a total
time interval of 12 minutes (with a control period of 2 minutes), for power to return after
a power spike. Clearly, a power attacker can launch multiple attacks within such a long
interval.
In summary, although power capping can mitigate power attack to some extent, it
cannot completely prevent power attack due to the three reasons discussed above. More
importantly, power capping is mainly designed to allow more aggressive power oversubscription in data centers [42], which can actually lead to a greater risk of power attack.

2.7.2 Server consolidation and energy proportionality
Servers are well known to consume too much power even when they are idling. Some recent studies show that current servers still draw about 60% of their peak power at idle [67].
This fact is far away from the ideal case where a server’s energy consumption can be proportional to its workload, which is called energy proportionality. An energy-proportional
server would consume little energy at idle and its energy consumption would increase proportionally to its workload intensity. Since the average server utilization in typical data centers is only 20-30% [67], energy-proportional servers would lead to a significant amount of
energy savings. While today’s servers are still not yet energy-proportional by themselves,
a recently proposed power management strategy, called server consolidation, can help
make a data center more energy-proportional by dynamically migrating and consolidating
the workloads onto a small number of servers and shutting down other servers for energy
savings. For example, some recent studies [81, 36, 77, 82] have proposed VM placement
solutions that rely on live VM migration for server consolidation.
While these server consolidation solutions can indeed reduce the overall energy consumption of a data center, they may actually also increase the risk of having power attacks. The key idea of server consolidation is to consolidate workload, so that only a
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smaller number of servers are used with high utilization, which generally comes with high
power consumption for each server. In addition, most server consolidation solutions try
to put consolidated workload on servers in the same rack or connected to the same PDU
for easier management. This strategy could also lead to less cooling costs, because only
those Computer Room Air Conditioning (CRAC) units that are near this rack/PDU needs
to be running, while other CRACs near those shutdown racks/PDUs can be turned off as
well for energy savings [21]. Therefore, server consolidation clearly would increase the
power consumption of the rack or PDU that is selected to run the consolidated workload.
This thus would push them further to the edge of having a power outage, providing an
attacker a better opportunity to launch power attacks.
Whereas future server hardware will certainly become more energy proportional to
their workloads, energy proportionality may also provide more opportunities for a power
attacker. The key reason is that energy proportionality can allow more aggressive power
oversubscription, which in turn increases the likelihood of having power outages. For
instance, for a today’s server that is not energy proportional, suppose its peak power
is 200 W and it consumes 80% of the peak power, i.e., 160 W, when it works at a 20%
utilization. Therefore, for a rack equipped with a CB that has a 2000 W of rated power limit,
the rack is likely to host 12 such servers with power oversubscription based on the power
values at 20% utilization. Now, let us suppose that we have energy-proportional servers
that consume only 40 W (20% of peak) of power at a 20% utilization. With aggressive
power oversubscription, now the rack can host up to 50 servers. In such a case, an
attacker can more easily increase the power consumption of the rack to about 4000 W,
simply by increasing the server utilization to only 40%, resulting in significant overload
and immediate trip of the CB and thus the shutdown of the rack.
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2.8

Mitigation Methods

The difficulty of defending against a power attack roots in three aspects. First, although
power oversubscription is the major vulnerability exposed to power attacks, it is also one
of the key techniques to reduce the operational cost of a data center. As data centers
continue to scale up in a fast speed and it is extremely expensive to upgrade data center power infrastructures, power oversubscription has become the trend and will be more
aggressive to accommodate more servers in a data center. Second, it is challenging to
monitor power consumption of each server accurately in a large scale data center. Since
deploying power meters for every server in a data center is too costly [37, 68], current
power management solutions tend to approximate the power consumption of each server
via utilization-based modeling. However, our work demonstrates that system utilization
cannot precisely reflect power consumption. Without accurate and timely measurement
of power consumption of servers, it will be difficult to detect and prevent power attacks.
Third, with the pervasion and easy access of cloud services, an attacker can consume the
computing resources of a data center like a normal user. Although the intention of attackers is very different from that of normal users, it is very difficulty to distinguish attackers
from normal users and deny their service requests at the beginning.
In spite of these difficulties, there exist feasible approaches to mitigating the consequence of a power attack. Tracking down the power consumption of individual incoming
requests and taking corresponding reaction can be a promising way to defend against a
power attack at the server level. Shen et al. [76] built models estimating the power consumption of requests throughout their execution life in a very fine-grained fashion. Such
an approach can effectively throttle high-consumption request rate and thus suppress
power spikes, which will mitigate power attacks to some extent. It also has minor impact
on the service performance.
At the cluster and data center levels, we propose a new load balancing strategy, called
power balancing, that uses the estimated power consumption as an important factor
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(along with CPU utilization or throughput) to distribute incoming service requests. Different from traditional load balancing algorithms that are based on system utilization and
amount of workload, power balancing captures service requests that consume a large
amount of power and evenly distributes them to servers connected to different branch
circuits in a data center. As a result, the chance of tripping a branch circuit breaker is
minimized. We leave the detailed design, implementation, and evaluation of the power
balancing mechanism as our future work.
The deployment of per-server UPS is an alternative way to defend against power
attacks. When each server contains a mini-UPS, a short period of power outage will not
bring down the server. Besides, per-server UPS is also promising to improve energy
efficiency [26]. However, replacing data-center-level UPS with tens of thousands of miniUPSes is not an easy task. Different UPS deployment mechanisms will bring in great
impact on data centers, and hence it will take time to have per-server UPSes be widely
deployed in data centers.

2.9

Related Work

While we are the first to propose the concept of power attack, there are numerous research
works studying power management in different computing environments.
A number of studies focus on improving power management in data centers. Some
works seek to save energy by adjusting workload distribution algorithms in a data center [96, 63], while some other works aim at reducing power consumption of individual
servers [33, 87]. However, even with these solutions, data centers are still under high
power provisioning pressure and rely on power oversubscription to handle this pressure.
A research conducted by Fu et al. [43] demonstrates how much power consumption
and how long such consumption lasts will trip a CB in a data center. Their study shows
that the time to trip a CB has functional relationship with the amount of power that exceeds
the rated power of the CB. The more power consumption exceeds the rated power of CB,
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the less time it takes to trip the CB. Their study provides the theoretical support for more
aggressive power oversubscription.
A study on power consumption of high performance computation benchmarks is conducted by Kamil et al. [52]. They analyzed the power consumption patterns of different HPC benchmarks including NAS [13], STREAM [16], and High Performance Linpack
(HPL). Their work supports our argument that different computation workloads will lead
to considerably different power consumption patterns. Their study also demonstrates
that HPL is the benchmark whose power consumption is the closest to that of real world
computation-intensive scientific workload.
Although many server consolidation solutions only take resource consumption into account [62, 36], there exist previous works studying the power and energy savings brought
by server consolidation [69, 77]. While these studies focus on the power consumption
before and after VM migration, we demonstrate that the additional power consumption
during migration can be exploited by a malicious attacker. The work of Liu et al. [64]
models the power consumption during VM migration. They demonstrated that different
VM migration mechanisms and configurations will lead to different migration power consumptions. Their work implies that an attacker can impose additional workload to the
to-be-migrated VMs to increase power consumption during migration.
Some of the previous studies on web services demonstrate that there are different
ways to increase resource/power consumption with specially crafted web requests. The
work of Wu et al. [88] observes that cache misses generate more power consumption at
a web server. A research conducted by Crosby et al. [39] introduces the computational
attack against web servers. By sending requests with certain data sequence, an attacker
can force some data structure operations to suffer the worst case algorithm complexity,
therefore costing extra computing resources and thus resulting in more power consumption.
Wu et al. [88] introduced a concept called energy attack. While energy attack also
attempts to increase power consumption of a target, it is a different concept from power
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attack. The goal of energy attack is to enlarge the operational cost of a victim (usually
a web service provider) by increasing overall energy consumption, but our power attack
can trip CBs in a data center, which can lead to more disastrous damage. Normally an
energy attack increases the power consumption of victim moderately for a long period,
which has high demand of stealthiness. In contrast, a power attack needs to generate
significant power spikes in a relatively short period.

2.10

Conclusion

In this chapter, we investigate the vulnerability of power oversubscription in data centers
and introduce the concept of power attack. We explore different attack vectors in PaaS,
IaaS and SaaS environments, respectively. In PaaS, we demonstrate that an attacker
can manipulate running workloads to significantly increase power consumption. In IaaS,
we propose the concept of parasite attack and further show that VM migration can be
exploited for helping to mount a power attack. In SaaS, we craft high power consumption
requests that can trigger cache misses and intensive floating point operations to launch
a power attack. Our experimental results show that a power attack can easily increase
power consumption of a target by over 30% in different environments and our power
attack trips the CB of our server room. We further conduct a data center level simulation
based on real world traces. The simulation results indicate that a power attack can bring
down a PDU or even an entire data center. Moreover, we discuss the impact of various
power management schemes upon power security of data centers and propose effective
defenses to mitigate power attacks.
As the future work, on one hand, we will further explore more efficient and stealthy
power attack vectors in different data center environments; on the other hand, we will
systematically study defense techniques, develop prototypes, and conduct experiments
to evaluate their effectiveness against power attacks in real scenarios.
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Chapter 3

A Measurement Study on
Co-residence Threat inside the
Cloud
In this chapter, we introduce our systematical investigation on co-residence threat in IaaS
cloud.
While Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) is the pioneer of IaaS, it has the largest
business scale among mainstream IaaS vendors [49, 84]. Therefore, we focus our study
on Amazon EC2. More specifically, our measurement is mainly conducted in the largest
data center hosting EC2 service: the northern Virginia data center or widely known as
US-East region.
In our measurement study, we first performed a 15-day continuous measurement on
the data center using ZMap [41] to investigate this data center’s business scale and some
basic management policies. With the basic knowledge of the cloud, we explore how EC2
has adjusted VM placement to enhance security. We further evaluate how much effort an
attacker needs to expend to achieve co-residence in different circumstances. Comparing
our evaluation results with those from 2008 [74], we demonstrate that the VM placement
adjustment made by EC2 during the past years has mitigated the co-residence threat.
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As network management plays a critical role in cloud performance and security, we
also investigate how the networking management in EC2 has been calibrated to suppress
co-residence threat. We conducted large scale of trace-routing from multiple sources.
Based on our measurement, we highlight how the current networking configuration of EC2
is different from what it was and demonstrate how such evolution impacts co-residence
inside the cloud. In particular, we measured the change of routing configuration made
by EC2 to increase the difficulty of cloud cartographic. We also propose a new algorithm
to identify whether a rack is connected with Top of Rack switch or End of Row switch.
With this algorithm, we are able to derive the network topology of EC2 and such topology
information is useful for achieving co-residence inside the cloud.
To protect the tenants from co-residence threats with isolated networking environments, EC2 has introduced the service of Virtual Private Cloud (VPC). While VPC can
isolate the instances from the large networking pool of EC2, it does not physically isolate the instances. After profiling the VPC usage and the routing configurations in VPC,
we propose a novel approach to speculating the physical location of an instance in VPC
based on trace-routing information. Our experiments show that even if a cloud instance
is hidden behind VPC, an adversary can still gain co-residence with the victim with some
extra efforts.
Finally, we briefly compare EC2 with other two mainstream IaaS vendors: Microsoft
Azure and Rackspace. We summarize the advantages and disadvantages of their management policies from the perspective of security, and propose solutions to manage data
centers in a more efficient and secure fashion.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.1 introduces background and related work on cloud measurement and security. Section 3.2 presents our
measurement results on understanding the overview of Amazon EC2 and its basic management policies. Section 3.3 details our measurement on VM placement in EC2, including co-residence quantification. Section 3.4 quantifies the impact of EC2 improved
network management upon co-residence. Section 3.5 describes VPC, the most effective
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defense against co-residence threat and reveals the haunted co-residence threat in VPC.
Section 3.6 briefly discusses the methods for IaaS vendors to manage the cloud more
securely. Finally, Section 3.7 draws the conclusion.

3.1

Background and Related Work

To leverage physical resources efficiently and provide high flexibility, IaaS vendors place
multiple VMs owned by different tenants on the same physical machine. Generally, a
scenario where VMs from different tenants are located on the same physical machine
is called co-residence. In this work, the definition of co-residence is further relaxed. We
define two VMs located in the same physical rack as co-residence. Thus, two VMs located
in the same physical machine is considered as machine-level co-residence, while two VMs
located in the same rack is defined as rack-level co-residence.

3.1.1 Co-residence threat
The threat of co-residence in the cloud was first identified by Ristenpart et al. [74] in
2009. Their work demonstrates that an attacker can place a malicious VM co-resident
with a target and then launch certain attacks such as side channel and covert channel
attacks. Following Ristenpart’s work, Xu et al. [92] studied the bit rate of cache-based
covert channel in EC2. Wu et al. [89] constructed a new covert channel on a memory bus
with a much higher bit rate, resulting in more serious threats in an IaaS cloud. Zhang et
al. [99] proposed a new framework to launch side channel attacks as well as approaches to
detect and mitigate co-residence threat in the cloud [98, 100]. Bates et al. [27] proposed
a co-resident watermarking scheme to detect co-residence by leveraging active traffic
analysis.
The reason we define different levels of co-residence is that some attacks do not
require VMs to be located on the same physical machine, but rather in the same rack
or in a higher level network topology. For instance, Xu et al. [95] proposed a new threat
53

called power attack in the cloud, in which an attacker can rent many VMs under the same
rack in a data center and cause a power outage. There are also some side channel and
covert channel attacks that only require the co-residence in the same sub-network [23].
In parallel with our work, Varadarajan et al. [80] performed a systematical study on
placement vulnerability in different clouds. While their work mainly stands at the attacker
side to explore more effective launch strategies for achieving co-residence in three different clouds, our work performs an in-depth study to understand the evolution of cloud
management and the impact on co-residence threat in Amazon EC2. The two complementary works both support the point that public clouds are still vulnerable to co-residence
threat.

3.1.2 Measurement in the cloud
In contrast to the measurement on private clouds from an internal point of view[29], the
measurement works on public data centers are mostly conducted from the perspective
of cloud customers. Wang et al. [83] demonstrated that in a public cloud, the virtualization technique induces a negative impact on network performance of different instance
types. The work of Xu et al. [93] measures network performance in Amazon EC2 and
demonstrates a long tail distribution of the latency. Their work also analyzes the reason
behind the long tails and proposes a new VM deployment solution to address this issue.
Bermudez et al. [28] performed a large-scale measurement on Amazon AWS traffic. Their
study shows that most web service traffic towards Amazon AWS goes to the data center
in Virginia, U.S. Some recent studies [49, 84] measure how web services are deployed
in public clouds. They found that although many top-ranked domains deploy their subdomains into the cloud, most subdomains are located in the same region or zone, resulting
in a relatively poor fault tolerance.
In contrast to those measurement efforts, our study provides a measurement analysis
from the perspective of security to reveal the management policies of a public cloud and
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Figure 3.1: The system used to scan EC2.
their impact upon co-residence threat.

3.2

An Overview of EC2 Management

As the pioneer of IaaS, Amazon EC2 deploys its data centers all around the world, hosting
the largest scale of IaaS business. In this section, we introduce some terminology in EC2
and provide an overview of the EC2 environment.

3.2.1 Instance type
An instance represents a virtual machine (VM) in the cloud, so we use the term “instance”
and “VM” interchangeably throughout the rest of the dissertation. EC2 provides a list of
instance types for clients to select while launching a new instance. The type of an instance
indicates the configuration of the VM, determining the amount of resources the VM can
use. The instance type is defined in the format XX.XXX such as m1.small. The first part
of the instance type reveals the model of the physical server that will host this type of
instance. The second part indicates the “size” of the VM, i.e., the amount of resources
allocated to the instance. The detailed configuration of different instance types can be
found at [10].
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3.2.2 Regions and zones
Amazon EC2 has the concept of “region,” which represents the physical area where the
booted instance will be placed. Amazon has 9 locations around the world hosting EC2
services. Therefore, the instances in EC2 can be located in 9 regions: US east (northern
Virginia), US west (Oregon), US west (northern California), South America (Sao Paulo),
Asia Pacific southeast (Singapore), Asia Pacific southeast (Sydney), Asia Pacific northeast (Tokyo), EU west (Ireland), and EU central (Frankfurt). As pointed out in previous
work [49], the majority of IaaS business is hosted in the US east region, e.g., in the data
center located in northern Virginia. Most existing research on cloud measurement was
conducted on this region [28, 57, 74]. Therefore, we also focus our study on the US east
region. For the rest of the dissertation, we use the term “cloud” to mean the EC2 US
east region and the term “data center” to mean the Amazon EC2 data center in northern
Virginia, US.
In addition to regions, Amazon EC2 also allows clients to assign an instance to a certain “zone.” A zone is a logical partition of the space within a region. Previous work shows
that the instances in the same zone share common characters in private IP addresses,
and likely instances within the same zone are physically close to each other [74, 89].
There are four availability zones in the US east region: us-east-1a, us-east-1b, us-east1c, and us-east-1d.

3.2.3 Naming
The naming service is essential to cloud management. On one hand, the naming service
can help customers to easily access their instances and simplify resource management.
On the other hand, the naming service should help the cloud vendor to manage the cloud
efficiently with high network performance.
In EC2, an instance is automatically assigned two domain names: one public and one
private. The public domain name is constructed based on the public IP address of the
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instance, while the private domain name is constructed based on either the private IP
address or the MAC address. Performing a DNS lookup outside EC2 returns the public
IP of the instance, while performing a DNS lookup inside EC2 returns the private IP of the
instance.

3.2.4 Scanning EC2 inside and outside
To better understand the environment and business scale of EC2, we performed a 15-day
continuous measurement on the EC2 US east region.
Figure 3.1 illustrates our system to scan EC2. First we deployed a scanner outside
EC2 to scan the cloud through a public IP address. Since EC2 publishes the IP range
for its IaaS instances, our scanner uses ZMap [41] to scan the specified ranges of IP
addresses. The ports we scanned include: ports 20 and 21 used for FTP, port 22 used
for SSH, port 23 for telnet, ports 25 and 587 for SMTP, port 43 for WHOIS, port 53 for DNS,
port 68 for DHCP, port 79 for Finger protocol, port 80 for HTTP, port 118 for SQL, port 443
for HTTPS, and port 3306 for MySQL. We also performed an ICMP echo scan. After
scanning, our outside scanner obtained a list of live hosts in EC2 with the corresponding
public IP addresses. In the next step, we performed automatic domain name generation.
As mentioned above, the public domain name of an instance in EC2 can be derived using
its public IP. This step produces a list of public domain names of live hosts. The generated
public domain names were then sent to our inside scanner deployed inside EC2. Our
inside scanner then performed DNS lookups for these domain names. Due to the DNS
lookup mechanism of EC2, the DNS server in EC2 answered the queries with the private
IP addresses of the hosts. Reaching this point, our measurement system can detect live
hosts in EC2 with their domain names, IP addresses, as well as the mapping between
the public IP address and private IP address.
The scan interval is set to 20 minutes, which is a trade-off between cost and accuracy.
Scanning the entire EC2 US east region per port takes about 40 seconds, and we have
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Table 3.1: Number of instances hosting a certain service
Live
instances

FTP

SSH

Telnet

SMTP

WHOIS

DNS

DHCP

Finger

HTTP

SQL

HTTPS

MYSQL

24,962

327,294

350

18,376

305

3,392

15

68

441,499

48

261,446

25,872

14 ports to scan. This means that scanning all the ports will take around 10 minutes.
Note that our measurement also includes DNS lookups for all the detected live hosts.
Performing these DNS lookups takes around 20 minutes, which is approximately the time
for two rounds of scanning.
Our scanning measurement provides us an overview of the large business scale of
EC2, the diversity of services, and the dynamic running environment. This scanning measurement also gives us the knowledge base to understand co-residence threat.

3.2.5 Business scale of EC2
Figure 3.2 illustrates the number of all the detected live instances in EC2 US east region
during the measurement period. We can see that the business scale in EC2 US east
region is very impressive. Our scanning can always detect more than 650,000 live instances in the cloud. During the peak time, we can detect almost 700,000 live instances.
It is noteworthy that our system only scans some common ports. Besides the instances
we detected, there are some instances with no common ports opened or within the VPC
that do not have public IP addresses. Thus, the real number of live instances in the cloud
could be even larger.
Table 3.1 lists the break-down statistics, showing the number of instances hosting a
certain service on average. It is obvious that web service still dominates the usage in
IaaS. Most customers rent the instances to host their web services. Among these web
services (i.e., HTTP), more than half of them deploy HTTPS at the same time. Since the
default way of accessing an instance in EC2 is through SSH, the number of instances
listening on port 22 is the second largest. There are also considerable instances hosting
FTP service, DNS service, and database service (MYSQL+SQL). For the rest of services,
the number of instances hosting them are less significant.
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Figure 3.2: Number of live instances in EC2 US east region.

3.2.6 Dynamic environment of EC2
Our measurement can also reflect the dynamic environment of EC2 to some extent. First,
as shown in Figure 3.2, the number of live instances varies over time within a day. We
observed a similar pattern each day: the peak time is around 5 p.m. (EST) while the
service reaches a valley around 4 a.m. (EST). Despite this diurnal pattern, the difference
in the number of live instances between peak and valley is not as significant as we expected. There are only 1,000 more live instances at peak than valley, which is relatively
small considering the overall 650,000 live instances. The diurnal pattern is reasonable,
as 4 a.m. EST is very early morning for the US east coast and it is also midnight for the
US west coast. It is intuitive that at this time period fewer users are using EC2. The small
difference between peak and valley can be explained from two aspects. First, most instances run stable services such as web and database services. These instances remain
active all the time. Second, although the data center is located in the US, the customers
are distributed all around the world. For instance, Bermudez et al. [28] demonstrated that
the Virginia data center is responsible for more than 85% of EC2 traffic in Italy. The time
of 4 a.m. on the US east coast is 10 a.m. in Italy when customers are very active there.
We are also interested in how dynamic the cloud environment is. Figure 3.3 illustrates
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Figure 3.3: Number of changed instances between each round of measurement and
number of missed DNS lookups in each round.
how many instances are shutdown, newly booted, or re-located between each round of
measurement. We can see there are more than 15,000 hosts that are changed every 20
minutes, indicating that EC2 is a very dynamic environment with tens of VMs booted and
shut down every second.
Besides the dynamics of live instances, we are also interested in the networking dynamics. During our measurement, we observed overall 975,032 distinct private IP addresses and 1,024,589 distinct public IP addresses. We recorded all the mappings from
public IP to private IP and the mappings from private IP to public IP during our measurement. We also recorded the mappings that are changed during the measurement period.
Over the course of our 15-day measurement, 103,242 mappings changed. This implies
that EC2 has likely recruited dynamic NAT for address translation.
Figure 3.4 shows the private IP addresses that are included in the changed mappings.
It is clear that the IP address pool in the cloud is dynamic as well. The density of the IPs in
a certain range is significantly higher than other areas. This range of private IPs are mostly
assigned to micro and small instances. Since micro and small instances are usually used
for temporary purposes, ON/OFF operations on them are more frequent, leading to more
frequent changes in private-public IP mappings.
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availability zone us-east-1a

3.3

The Impact of VM Placement upon Co-residence

The VM placement policy of the cloud determines how easy or hard it is for an attacker
to achieve co-residence. In this section, we present our measurement on VM placement
and quantification of achieving co-residence. By comparing our measurement results with
previous work, we demonstrate how the VM placement policy has been evolving in EC2
and its impact on mitigating co-residence threats.

3.3.1 Basic understanding of VM placement
We first launched a sufficiently large number of instances with different types in EC2.
Then, we had two tasks to fulfill: (1) collecting networking (i.e., location) information of
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Figure 3.6: The distribution of internal IP addresses of instances in different availability
zones
launched instances and (2) quantifying co-residence threat, i.e., given the current VM
placement policy of EC2, how much effort an attacker needs to make to achieve coresidence. Since the process of achieving co-residence requires the knowledge of instance location, we can complete the two tasks together. For every instance we launched
while seeking co-residence, we recorded its private IP address and public IP address. We
also performed an automatic trace-route from the instance to its “neighbors” that share
the /24 prefix with it. This information can provide us the basic knowledge of where the
instances are placed.
During our measurement, we recorded the detailed information of 2,200 instances
of type t1.micro, 1,800 instances of type m1.small, 1,000 instances of type m1.medium,
1,000 instances of type m3.medium, 80 instances of m3.large, and 40 instances of m3.xlarge.
We selected some random samples from the instances we recorded to study the internal
IP distribution. We investigated how private IP addresses are associated by the instance
type and availability zones, i.e., whether the VM placement has type and zone locality.
Our results demonstrate that currently EC2 still exhibits certain type and zone locality,
i.e., instances with the same type in the same zone are more likely to be placed close to
one another. However, compared with corresponding results in 2008 [74], such locality
has been significantly weakened.
Figure 3.5 illustrates the private IP distribution of some sample instances with different
types in zone us-east-1a. The IP distribution exhibits a certain type locality. We can see
from the figure that the instances of the same type tend to have closer internal IPs, i.e.,
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they are more likely to be placed physically close to one another. However, compared
with corresponding results in 2008 [74], we can see that such type locality has been
significantly weakened.
We also study how availability zone could affect VM placement. Figure 3.6 illustrates
the internal IP distribution of instances in different availability zones. As we can see, VM
placement still has availability zone locality, i.e., instances in the same zone are more
likely to have their internal IP addresses located within a certain range. However, such
locality is also much weaker than in 2008 [74].
After understanding the current VM placement in EC2, we further investigate coresidence threats in EC2.

3.3.2 Quantifying machine level co-residence
To understand how VM placement will affect co-residence, we assess the effort one needs
to make to achieve machine level co-residence in two scenarios. The first scenario is to
have a random pair of instances located on the same physical machine, and the second
scenario is to have an instance co-reside with a targeted victim.

3.3.2.1

Random co-residence

To make our random co-residence quantification more comprehensive, we perform our
measurement with different instance types and in different availability zones. Since zone
us-east-1c is no longer hosting t1, m1, c1, and m3 instances, our measurement is performed in zone us-east-1a, us-east-1b, and us-east-1d. We achieve co-residence pairs
with t1.micro, m1.small, m1.medium, and m3.medium. We did not achieve co-residence
with large, xlarge or 2xlarge instances, because there are only 1 to 4 such large instances
on one physical machine and it will be very difficult and costly to achieve co-residence
with these types. Overall, we conduct 12 sets of experiments, with each set targeting a
specific type of instances in a specific availability zone.
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In each set of experiments, we perform rounds of co-residence probing until we find
a co-residence pair. For the sake of robustness, EC2 has never placed instances from
the same user on the same physical machine [74]. Therefore, we set up two accounts to
launch instances simultaneously. Within one round, each account launches 20 instances,
which will produce 400 pairs of co-residence candidates. Once a co-residence pair is
verified, this set of experiments are terminated and the corresponding cost is recorded.
If there is no co-residence pair found in this round, we move on to the next round by
terminating all running instances and launching another 20 instances in each account,
and then repeat the same procedure.
Given a pair of instances, verifying whether they are located on the same physical
machine involves two steps: (1) pre-filtering unlikely pairs and (2) using a covert channel
to justify co-residence.
For the first step, we need to screen out those pairs that are not likely to be co-resident
to reduce probing space. Since the private IP address of an instance can indicate its
physical location to some extent, and if the private IP addresses of two instances are not
close enough, the two instances will have little chance to be co-resident. Based on this
heuristic, we use the share of /24 prefix as the prerequisite of co-residence, i.e., if two
instances do not share the /24 prefix, we consider them as not being co-resident and
bypass the highly costly step 2. The rationale of setting the /24 prefix sharing as pre-filter
is twofold:
1. First, the prerequisite of the /24 prefix sharing will not likely rule out any co-residence
instance pairs. The number of instances that are hosted on the same physical machine is limited. Even for micro instances, there are no more than 32 instances running on a physical machine. For the instance type with larger size, there are even
fewer instances running on a physical machine. In contrast, a /24 address space
can contain 256 instances. Therefore, two co-resident instances are unlikely to be
in different /24 subnets. Moreover, we obtained some co-residence pairs without

64

Empirical CDF
1

F(x)

0.8
0.6
0.4
Micro
Small

0.2
0

0

20

40
60
80
Private address distance

100

120

Figure 3.7: CDF of IP address distances between co-resident VMs.
any pre-filtering and recorded the private IP address distance between a pair of coresidence instances. Figure 3.7 illustrates the CDF of IP address distance between
two co-residence instances. The distance is calculated as the difference between
the two 32-bit integers of the two IP addresses. From the results we can figure
out that most of these co-residence instances share the /27 prefix, which further
confirms that the /24 prefix filtering will introduce very few, if any, false negatives.
2. Second, the prerequisite of sharing the /24 prefix can effectively narrow down the
candidate space. Each time we use one account to launch 20 instances and use
another account to launch another 20 instances, we will have 400 candidate pairs.
During our measurement, we generated more than 40 rounds of such 400-pair
batches. The average number of instance pairs that share the /24 prefix among
400 candidates is only 4. This means the /24 prefix sharing prerequisite can help us
to screen out 99% of the candidates, which significantly accelerates the process of
co-residence verification. During the 40 rounds of measurement, five co-residence
pairs are observed.
The second step is to use a covert channel to verify whether two instances are actually located on the same physical machine. We use the technique introduced by Wu
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Figure 3.8: The service hour spent, i.e., the number of instances booted to achieve coresidence.
et al. [89] to construct a memory-bus-based covert channel between two instances. If
the two instances can communicate with each other via the covert channel, then they
are located on the same physical machine. This covert-channel-based verification can
guarantee zero false positives.
The cost of achieving co-residence includes financial cost and time. According to the
pay-as-you-go billing system, the financial cost is mainly determined by the service hours
consumed during the co-residence probing. Every time an instance is launched, one
billing hour is charged. Thus, the more probing instances an attacker needs to launch,
the higher financial cost it will cause. In our experiments, we use only two accounts. In
a real world attack, an attacker could use more accounts to launch the attack in parallel, which will result in less time required to achieve co-residence. However, under the
same condition, regardless of attack process optimization, the time spent to achieve coresidence should have a positive correlation with the number of instances to launch, i.e.,
the more instances need to launch, the more time spent for detecting co-residence.
Figure 3.8 illustrates how many instances are required to achieve co-residence, while
Figure 3.9 illustrates the actual financial cost. Figure 3.10 illustrates how much time it
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Figure 3.9: The financial cost (in US dollar) to achieve co-residence.
takes to achieve co-residence, i.e., the time cost. For each type of instance, the measurement repeats for five times and the mean value is shown in the figures. From the
figures, it is evident that the cost for achieving co-residence of different types in different
availability zones is quite different. Intuitively, as a larger instance has higher resource
charge, it costs more money to achieve co-residence with those instances at a larger size.
However, there is no such rule that the smaller size an instance is, the lower time cost we
need to pay for co-residence.

3.3.2.2

Target co-residence

In the quantification of achieving co-residence with a particular target, we first randomly
launched one instance with specific type from one account as the target. Then, from the
other account, we also performed many rounds of co-residence probing until we found the
instance that is co-resident with the target. The process of verifying co-residence remains
the same. As demonstrated by the verification results of random co-residence above,
different availability zones do not greatly impact the difficulty of achieving co-residence.
Here we only show the results when our target instances are placed in zone us-east-1a.
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Figure 3.10: The time spent to achieve co-residence.
Figures 3.11, 3.12 and 3.13 illustrate the number of instances to launch, the financial
cost, and the time taken to achieve co-residence with a particular target, respectively. For
each type of instance, the measurement is repeated for 15 times and the mean value is
illustrated. The error bar with standard deviation is also shown in the figures.
As is intuitive, achieving co-residence with a particular target requires launching more
instances than achieving random co-residence. Getting a random co-residence pair requires launching 200 to 300 instances with two accounts (i.e., 100 to 150 instances per account), which can be done in 5 to 8 rounds. In contrast, achieving co-residence with a particular target requires launching 300 to 400 instances, which will take 15 to 20 rounds with
each round launching 20 instances from one account. However, achieving co-residence
with a particular target does not cost more time than achieving a random co-residence
pair. The reason for this is simple: To get a random pair, we need to check 400 candidate
pairs in each round, but to get a co-residence pair with a target, we only need to check
20 candidates in one round.
It is also possible that an attacker is unable to achieve co-residence with a certain
target due to various reasons, e.g., the target physical machine reaches full capacity.
During our study, we failed to achieve co-residence with two targets, one is m1.medium
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Figure 3.11: The service hour spent, i.e. the number of instances booted to achieve
co-residence with a target.
type and the other is m3.medium type. By failing to achieve co-residence we mean that
after trying with more than 1,000 probing instances in two different days, we still cannot
achieve co-residence with these two targets.
Overall, it is still very feasible to achieve co-residence in EC2 nowadays. However, an
attacker needs to launch hundreds of instances to reach that goal, which may introduce
considerable cost. In Section 4.4, we will compare our results to previous studies, demonstrating that achieving machine-level co-residence has become much more difficult than
before, due to the change in cloud environments and VM placement policies.

3.3.3 Quantifying rack level co-residence
While covert channel and side channel attacks require an attacker to obtain an instance
located exactly on the same physical machine with the victim, some malicious activities
only need coarse-grained co-residence. Xu et al. [95] proposed a new attack called power
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Figure 3.12: The financial cost (in US dollar) to achieve co-residence with a target.
attack. In their threat model, the attacker attempts to significantly increase power consumption of multiple machines connected by the same power facility simultaneously to
trip the circuit breaker (CB). Since these machines located in the same rack are likely to
be connected by the same CB, in a power attack the attack instances are not required to be
placed on a same physical machine. Instead the attacker should place many instances
within the same rack as the victim, i.e., achieving as much rack-level co-residence as
possible. We performed measurement on how much effort is required to place a certain
number of instances under the same rack.
We first use one account to launch 20 instances, and then we check whether there are
any instances in this batch that are located within the same rack. If there are no instances
located in the same rack, we just randomly pick an instance and set its hosting rack as
the target rack. Thanks to the Top of Rack(ToR) switch topology, verifying whether two
instances are in the same rack is simple. Through a simple trace-routing, we can verify
whether an instance has the same ToR switch with our target rack. This rack level co-
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Figure 3.13: The time spent to achieve co-residence with a target.
residence can be further verified by performing trace-route from the candidate instance
to the target instance. If the two instances are in the same rack, there should be only one
hop in the trace, i.e., they are one hop away.
Figure 3.14 shows our measurement results. It is clear that an attacker can easily have
multiple instances located within the same rack. The information of ToR switch helps the
attacker quickly verify the rack-level co-residence. Since the malicious attack based on
the rack-level co-residence is newly proposed [95], EC2 is unlikely to take any action to
suppress rack-level co-residence.

3.3.4 Battle in VM placement
Table 3.2 lists the data from the original work on co-residence [74]. We can see that it
was extremely easy to achieve co-residence in 2008. With two accounts each launching
20 instances, there were 7 or 8 co-residence pairs observed. In the 2012 work [89], the
cost of achieving a co-residence instance pair is also briefly reported: A co-residence pair
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Table 3.2: The number of co-residence pairs achieved by one round of probing in
2008 [74].

Zone 1

Zone 2

Zone 3

Account A
1
10
20
1
10
20
1
10
20

Account B
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20

Co-residence
1
5
7
0
3
8
1
2
8

(micro) is achieved with 160 instances booted.
As we can see, nowadays it is much more difficult to achieve co-residence than in 2008
and 2012. EC2 could have adjusted its VM placement policies to suppress co-residence.

3.3.4.1

A larger pool

The business of EC2 is scaling fast, and thus it is intuitive that Amazon keeps deploying
more servers into EC2. The measurement in 2008 [74] shows that there were three availability zones in the US east region. At present, the availability zones are expanded to
four. Such expansion in availability zones also indicates that the business scale of EC2
is growing rapidly.
The measurement in 2008 [74] also shows 78 unique Domain0 IP addresses with
1785 m1.small instances, which means it only observed 78 physical machines that host
m1.small service. Due to the evolution in EC2 management, we are no longer able to iden72

tify Dom0. However, we have identified at least 59 racks of servers that host m1.small instances. This suggests that the number of physical machines hosting m1.small instances
is significantly larger than that in 2008. The enlarged pool provides EC2 with more flexibility to place incoming VMs, which is one of the reasons that it is now much more difficult
to achieve co-residence than before.

3.3.4.2

Time locality

Time locality can help to achieve co-residence. Time locality means if two accounts launch
instances simultaneously, it is more likely that some of these instances with time locality
will be assigned to the same physical machine.
To verify whether such time locality exists in the current EC2, we performed another
measurement. We set up four groups of experiments. In the first group, the two accounts always launch 20 VMs simultaneously. In the second group, the second account
launches 20 VMs 10 minutes after the first account launches 20 VMs. In the third group,
the launching time of the second account is one hour apart from that of the first account. In
the fourth group, the second account launches VMs four hours after the first account. All
instances are t1.micro type. In each group, the measurement terminates whenever a coresidence pair is observed and the number of instances required to achieve co-residence
is recorded. All the experiments are repeated 5 times and the average is noted.
Figure 3.15 illustrates the number of instances required to achieve co-residence in
each case. We can see that the efforts required to achieve co-residence do not vary
significantly with the change of instance launching intervals. This implies that time locality
seems to be very weak in the current EC2, which increases co-residence cost.

3.3.4.3

Dynamic assignment

In 2008, the IP addresses and instances in EC2 were assigned in a relatively static manner [74]. However, as we have demonstrated before, there are considerable mapping
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changes in our measurement, which indicates that the IP assignment has introduced a
certain dynamism.
Meanwhile, in 2008, the instances were placed strictly based on the instance type,
i.e., one physical machine can only host one type of instance [74]. In contrast, our measurement results show that such an assumption may not hold anymore. First, some small
instances use internal IP addresses that were used by micro instances before. Second,
during our measurement, by accident we observed that one live small instance has very
close IP to a medium instance. We then attempted to build a covert channel between
them. It turned out that the covert channel did work, which verifies that these two instances
with different types are indeed located on a same physical machine. Following such an
observation, in the rest of our rest measurement we also kept checking co-residence
between different types of instances. Overall, five pairs of different-type co-residence
instances are observed throughout our study. Our results indicate that in certain cases
current VM placement policies in EC2 can mix different types of instances on one physical
machine, potentially to reduce fragmentation. Such a policy also increases the difficulty
of achieving co-residence.

3.4

The Impact of Network Management upon Co-residence

As network management plays a critical role in data center management, it has a significant impact on co-residence. On one hand, an attacker attempts to obtain as much
networking information inside the cloud as possible to ease the gaining process of coresidence. On the other hand, the cloud vendors try to protect sensitive information while
not degrading regular networking management and performance. In this section, we introduce the adjustments made by EC2 in network management during recent years to
mitigate co-residence threat and the effectiveness of these approaches.
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with Top of Rack switch.

3.4.1 Methodology
To study the adjustment made by EC2 in network management, we performed large scale
trace-routing. First, for the instances we booted, we performed “neighborhood tracerouting” from our instances to their “neighbors.” Here we define neighbors as all those
instances that share the /23 prefix of their private IP addresses with our source instances.
Such trace-routing can inform us of the routing paths between an instance and other
instances in the same rack and neighboring racks.
We next performed trace-routing from several of our instances (i.e., the instances we
booted) to all the instances in a target list. We use the live host list from our scanning
measurement as the target list. Trace-routing from our instances to over 650,000 target
instances takes more than 8 days, but it can help us to understand network management
in EC2 in a more comprehensive manner.

3.4.2 The evolution in routing configuration
The routing information has been leveraged to perform cloud cartography [74], which
can further be used to launch co-residence-based attacks. However, our trace-routing
results demonstrate that, as a response to cloud cartography, EC2 has adjusted its routing
configurations to enhance security in the past few years. The adjustments we found are
listed as follows.
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3.4.2.1

Hidden Domain0

EC2 uses XEN as the virtualization technique in the cloud. According to the networking
I/O mechanism of XEN [25], all the network traffic of guest VMs (instances) should travel
through the privileged instance: Domain-0 (i.e, Dom0). Thus, Dom0 acts as the gateway of all instances on the physical machine, and all instances on this physical machine
should have the same first-hop in their routing paths. Such Dom0 information provides
an attacker with a very efficient probing technique: by simply checking the Dom0’s IP
addresses of two instances, one can know whether they are co-resident. Therefore, to
prevent this Dom0 information divulgation, EC2 has hidden Dom0 in any and all routing
paths, i.e. at present the Dom0 does not appear in any trace-routing results.

3.4.2.2

Hidden hops

To suppress cloud cartography enabled by trace-routing, EC2 has hidden certain hops in
the routing paths. According to the work in May 2013 [57], traffic only needs to traverse
one hop between two instances on the same physical machine and two hops between
instances in a same rack but not on the same physical machine. The paths between
instances in different racks typically have 4 or 6 hops. However, our neighborhood tracerouting results show that the routing management has been changed in EC2.
First, a path of one hop does not necessarily indicate co-residence anymore. Our
neighborhood trace-routing results show that an instance can have a very large number
of 1-hop neighbors. For instance, one m1.small instance can have more than 60 1-hop
neighbors. It is technically impractical to host so many instances on an m1 machine.
To verify our hypothesis, we selected several pairs of instances with a 1-hop path and
checked co-residence using covert channel construction. Our co-residence verification
fails for most of these pairs, confirming that two instances with a 1-hop path do not necessarily co-locate on the same physical machine. This observation indicates that EC2
even hides the ToR switches in the routing path in some cases, leaving only one hop in
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the path between two instances in the same rack.
Second, we observed many odd-hop paths, accounting for 34.26% of all paths. In contrast, almost all the paths in the measurement conducted in May 2013 are even-hop [57].
This indicates that the network configuration of EC2 has changed since May 2013.
Third, the ToR switch of a source instance is shown as the first hop in the path, which
indicates that the ToR switch should be an L3 router. However, we cannot observe the
ToR switch of a target instance in the traces, implying that EC2 has configured the ToR
switch to hide itself in the incoming traffic to the rack. Moreover, among our traces, we
observed that 76.11% of paths have at least one hop filled with stars. The hops filled
with stars can be a result of the configuration of certain devices such as L2 switches; it is
also possible that EC2 has deliberately obscured those hops for security reasons. These
paths with invisible or obscured hops significantly increase the difficulty of conducting
cloud cartography.

3.4.3 Introducing VPC
To suppress the threat from internal networks, EC2 proposes a service called Virtual Private Cloud (VPC). VPC is a logically isolated networking environment that has a separate
private IP space and routing configuration. After creating a VPC, a customer can launch
instances into its VPC, instead of the large EC2 network pool. The customer can also
divide a VPC into multiple subnets, where each subnet can have a preferred availability
zone to place instances.
Moreover, EC2 provides instance types that are dedicated for VPC instances. These
instance types include t2.micro, t2.small, and t2.medium. According to the instance type
naming policy, instances with t2 type should be placed on those physical servers with the
t2 model.
An instance in a VPC can only be detected through its public IP address, and its private
address can never be known by any entity except the owner. Therefore, within a VPC,
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an attacker can no longer speculate the physical location of a target using its private IP
address, which significantly reduces the threat of co-residence.

3.4.4 Speculating network topology
Besides routing configuration, the knowledge of network topology also helps to achieve
co-residence, especially for high level co-residence such as rack-level. Figure 3.16 depicts the typical network topology in a data center. The core and aggregation switches
construct a tree topology. Before connecting to the aggregate switches, there are two
mainstream ways to connect servers in a rack/racks: End of Row (EoR) switches and
Top of Rack (ToR) switches.
For EoR switches, as illustrated in Figure 3.17, servers of several racks are connected
to the same EoR switch. To be more precise, an EoR switch can be a switch array including a group of interconnected switches. These switches can function as aggregate
switches themselves. For ToR switches, as illustrated in Figure 3.18, all servers in a
rack are first connected to a separate ToR switch, and then the ToR switch is connected
to aggregate switches. Such a topology has currently become the mainstream network
topology in a data center.
There are several variants of EoR topology, such as Middle of Rack (MoR) and ToR
switch with EoR management. Meanwhile, there are other potential topologies such as
OpenStack cluster in a data center. Therefore, we classify the network topology of a
rack/racks into two classes: ToR connected and non-ToR connected. To identify whether
a rack uses a ToR switch or a non-ToR switch, we analyze the neighborhood trace-routing
results of multiple instances. Based on our analysis, we proposed a method to identify
the network topology of a rack, ToR-connected or non-ToR-connected.
ToR-connected: a rack that deploys ToR switches must satisfy all of the following
conditions:
1. For an instance A in the rack, there should be at least one instance B that is only
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one hop away from A.
2. For an instance A in the rack, there should be at least 8 instances that are two hops
away from A.
3. For any two instances A and B, if (i) conditions 1 and 2 hold for both A and B, (ii)
the trace-routing path between A and B has no more than two hops, and (iii) for any
instance C, the first hop in the trace-routing path from A to C is the same as the first
hop in the path from B to C, then A and B are considered as being in the same ToR
rack.
4. For an instance A in the rack, for any trace-routing path with A as source and length
larger than 2, the first hop in the path should share the /16 prefix with the private IP
address of A.
The IP address of the first hop (i.e., ToR switch’s IP address) is used to differentiate two
ToR racks.
Non-ToR-connected: a rack that deploys non-ToR switches must satisfy all of the
following conditions:
1. For an instance A in the rack, there should be no instance B such that the path
between A and B has two hops.
2. For an instance A in the rack, for any instance B in EC2, either (i) A and B are
machine-level co-resident and the path between A and B has only one hop or (ii)
the path between A and B has more than two hops.
3. For two instances A and B, if (i) conditions 1 and 2 hold for both A and B, (ii) A and
B share the /24 prefix of their private IP, (iii) the trace-routing path between A and
B has 4 or 6 hops, and (iv) for any instance C, the first hop in the path between A
and C is the same as the first hop in the path between B and C, then A and B are
considered as being in the same non-ToR rack.
4. For an instance A in the rack, for any trace-routing path with A as source and length
larger than 2, the first hop in the path should not share the /20 prefix with the private
IP address of A.
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Again, the IP address of the first hop is used to differentiate two non-ToR racks.
In EC2, there are two “generations” of instances. The old generation carries all the
instances with m1 type, and the new generation covers all the instances with other types.
We applied our method on m1.small, m1.medium, m3.medium, and m3.large type, which
cover both old-generation instances and new-generation instances.
Overall, we identified 59 distinct racks that host m1.small instances, 18 racks that
host m1.medium instances, 22 racks that host m3.medium instances, and 10 racks that
host m3.large instances. Among the 109 racks, there are only 14 racks identified as
non-ToR-connected while the rest are ToR-connected. Among the 14 non-ToR racks, we
observed 12 old-generation racks, in which 7 racks host m1.small instances and 5 racks
host m1.medium instances, and only 2 new-generation racks host m3.medium instances.
Our results demonstrate that while both ToR racks and non-ToR racks exist in EC2,
ToR-connected is the dominating topology in EC2. Moreover, it is evident that newgeneration machines are more likely to be located in the ToR-connected topology, indicating that the ToR-connected topology has become the main trend. While the ToRconnected topology is easy to manage, the routing information is very straightforward
since the first hop reveals which rack the instance is in. Such information can be leveraged by an attacker to achieve rack-level co-residence.

3.5

A New Battle in VPC

Using VPC, customers can protect their instances in an isolated network environment.
However, VPC only logically isolates the networks. The instances from different VPCs
may still share the same physical machine, leaving the opportunity to achieve co-residence.
In this section, we first take an overview on the usage of VPC in EC2, and then we introduce a new method to attack instances that are hidden behind VPCs.
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Figure 3.19: The live instances in VPCs.

3.5.1 The overview of VPC usage
For those instances in the default networks of EC2, our inside scanner can obtain their
private addresses via DNS lookups. However, the DNS query for an instance in a VPC
will only return its public IP address. Therefore, the instances in a VPC can be easily
identified by checking the DNS query results of our inside scanner, i.e., any instance
whose private IP address cannot be detected by our inside scanner is an instance in a
VPC. Figure 3.19 shows the VPC usage in EC2. As we can see, all instances in VPC
are assigned public IP addresses in five different ranges: 107.20.0.0/14, 184.72.64.0/18,
54.208.0.0/15, 54.236.0.0/15, and 54.80.0.0/13. This implies that all instances in a VPC
are managed in a uniform manner. On average, in each round of our probing we can
observe 115,801 instances in a VPC, which are around 17% of all live instances observed,
demonstrating that VPC is widely used in EC2 to protect instances.

3.5.2 Routing paths of VPC instances
Since a VPC should be treated as a private network, the routing policies for instances
inside a VPC must be different from those in the default EC2 network. This routing dif-
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Figure 3.20: A sample trace-routing result from an instance in VPC to an instance in EC2.

Figure 3.21: A sample trace-routing result from an instance in EC2 to an instance in VPC.

ference can help us further understand the management of a VPC. To connect a VPC
to the public Internet, a customer must create a gateway and attach it to the VPC. The
gateway must be included into the route table of the VPC. All traffic from or to the Internet
must go through the gateway, but the traffic inside EC2 does not require the gateway to
be involved.
Besides the basic understanding of the routing configuration of a VPC, we also need to
know how a VPC is connected with the default EC2 network and other VPCs. We created
several VPCs with two different accounts. The instances with different types are launched
into these VPCs. Trace-routing is performed in four different ways: (1) trace-routing from
an instance in a VPC to another instance in the same VPC, (2) trace-routing from an
instance in a VPC to an instance in another VPC, (3) trace-routing from an instance in a
VPC to an instance in the default EC2 network, and (4) trace-routing from an instance in
the default EC2 network to an instance in a VPC.

3.5.2.1

Routing within VPC

Routing inside the same VPC is expected to be simple. We performed trace-routing between two instances in the same VPC, using both private and public IP addresses. The
results show that trace-routing with private IP or public IP addresses will yield different
routing paths. If trace-routing is performed with the private IP of the target instance, the
result path has only one-hop, i.e., the direct connection to the destination, which is reasonable. However, if trace-routing is performed with the public IP of the target, trace-routing
will return two hops with the first hop obscured with stars. Apparently, EC2 intentionally
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hides some routing information. The routing information between the two instances within
the same VPC is made transparent to customers. Such obscuration disables a customer
from speculating the physical location of the instances.
As discussed in Section V, even within the same VPC, two instances can be located in
different “subnets.” We also performed trace-routing between two instances in the same
VPC but in different subnets. The resulting paths do not differ from the paths between
two instances within the same subnet.

3.5.2.2

Routing between VPCs

The traffic between instances in different VPCs should traverse multiple switches and
routers. Surprisingly, we found that any routing path between any two instances in any
two different VPCs only has two hops: the first hop is obscured and the second hop is
the destination. EC2 once again obscures the routing path between VPCs to prevent an
adversary from revealing sensitive information of a VPC, e.g., the IP address of a gateway.

3.5.2.3

Routing from VPC to default EC2 network

Although instances in a VPC no longer share a private network with the default pool of
EC2, the switches/routers that connect VPCs might still be physically connected to the
other switches/routers in the data center. How EC2 routes the traffic between instances
in a VPC and instances in the default EC2 network can reveal its network topology to
some extent. Figure 3.20 shows a sample trace-routing result from an instance in a VPC
to an instance in the default EC2 network. We can see that the first two hops of the path
are obscured. This prevents us from knowing the switch/router that connects the VPC,
thereby hiding the physical location of VPC instances. However, we can still see parts of
the path and can infer the end-to-end latency based on the trace-routing result.
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3.5.2.4

Routing from default EC2 network to VPC

Figure 3.21 shows a sample trace-routing result from an instance in the default EC2 network to an instance in a VPC. The path is almost symmetric to the path from a VPC to
the default EC2 network. Again, the last two hops before reaching the destination are
obscured to hide the information of the router/switch.
Overall, EC2 manages a VPC in a transparent fashion, i.e., to a customer it should
look like all instances in a VPC are connected by a dedicated switch, just like a real private
network. However, instances in the same VPC are not physically located together. These
instances are still located in different racks and are connected to different ToR or EoR
switches. Thus, the traffic inside a VPC might still traverse multiple switches/routers.
Similarly, the traffic between an instance in a VPC and an instance in the default EC2
network can have a similar path to the traffic between two instances in the default EC2
network. However, EC2 hides or obscures certain hops in the path to provide the image
of “private network.”

3.5.3 Co-residence in VPC
The traditional way of achieving co-residence relies on the knowledge of private IP address to seek potential candidates. With VPC, this approach no longer works as VPC
hides the private IP address of an instance. An alternative is to infer the physical location
of a target based on the routing paths to the target. Unfortunately, our trace-routing results show that sensitive information of a routing path is obscured by EC2, and therefore
it also does not work well.
However, in our trace-routing results we found that the end-to-end latency to and from
an instance in a VPC varies with different instance types and the location of the instance.
This latency variation can be leveraged to help an attacker speculate the type and location
of a target instance. Moreover, while performing trace-routing between an instance in a
VPC and an instance in the default EC2 network, the number of hops required is not
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Table 3.3: End to end latency between different instances.
1.224ms

1am1.small
1.123ms

1am1.medium
1.025ms

2.237ms

1bm1.small
2.221ms

1bm1.medium
2.304ms

1.361ms

1.059ms

1.100ms

2.208ms

2.055ms

2.198ms

1.165ms

1.102ms

0.986ms

2.211ms

2.060ms

1.988ms

2.101ms

2.235ms

2.188ms

1.108ms

1.243ms

1.202ms

2.202ms

2.003ms

2.190ms

1.131ms

0.968ms

1.048ms

2.087ms

2.113ms

1.965ms

1.088ms

1.023ms

0.855ms

1a-t1.micro
1a-t1.micro
1am1.small
1am1.medium
1b-t1.micro
1bm1.small
1bm1.medium

1b-t1.micro

obscured. Therefore, the number of hops in a path can also be leveraged to derive useful
information for achieving co-residence.
Based on our measurement analysis, we propose a new method to achieve co-residence
with instances in a VPC. It has two steps: (1) speculate the type and availability zone of a
target and (2) launch probing instances with the same type in the same availability zone
and perform co-residence verification.

3.5.3.1

Type and zone speculation

We collected statistical data of the end-to-end latency between a pair of instances with
different types and in different zones. Table 3.3 shows part of the end-to-end latency
statistics. Each row represents an instance in a VPC with a certain type and availability
zone preference. Each column stands for an instance in the default EC2 network with
a certain type and availability zone preference. Each value in the table is calculated as
the average of 50 samples. Each sample is obtained with a distinct instance pair and is
averaged over five rounds of latency measurement. With this latency table, we are able
to construct a latency vector for each target instance in a VPC and use the latency vectors
to speculate the type and availability zone of a target.
There are three availability zones and each zone has six types: t1.micro, m1.small,
m1.medium, m1.large, m3.medium, and m3.large. Thus, the complete version of Table 3.3 has 18 rows and 18 columns, which can be found in our technical report [94].
Note that each row in the table can represent a latency vector, and such a latency vector
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derived from our controlled sampling is called a baseline vector.
In each different availability zone, we randomly select an instance for each different
type, resulting in 18 (3×6) sample instances in total for testing type and zone speculation.
For each target in a VPC, we perform trace-routing from each of our sample instances
to the target for 5 times and record the average end-to-end latency of each pair. Such
measurement can provide us 18 end-to-end latency values, which constitute an input
vector of length 18. We then calculate the cosine similarity between the input vector and
these 18 baseline vectors. The baseline latency vector that has the highest similarity with
the target input vector is selected, and we can speculate that the target instance has the
same {instance type, availability zone} as the instance in the selected baseline vector.

3.5.3.2

Verifying co-residence

To achieve co-residence with an instance in a VPC, our probing instances are also launched
in a VPC. There are two reasons that we do not use the instances in the default EC2 network as probing instances. First, it is possible that EC2 uses a separate algorithm to
place instances in a VPC. In other words, compared to an instance in the default EC2
network, an instance in a VPC may have a better chance to achieve co-residence with an
instance in another VPC. Second, as we have observed, the end-to-end latency between
two instances in two different VPCs is more stable than the latency between an instance
in the default EC2 network and an instance in a VPC, which allows us to leverage latency
for pre-filtering.
Similar to verifying co-residence in the default EC2 network, verifying co-residence in
a VPC also includes two steps: pre-filtering and covert channel construction. While the
way of using covert channel construction to confirm co-residence remains the same, the
pre-filtering process in a VPC is different.
To verify whether an attack instance is co-resident with a target, we rely on two rounds
of pre-filtering to screen out irrelevant candidates. First, we perform trace-routing from
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Figure 3.22: End-to-end latency between an instance in VPC and all other instances in
other VPCs in EC2.
our 18 sample instances to our attack instance and the target instance. If any path from
the sample instance to the attack instance is not equivalent to the corresponding path
from the sample instance to the target in terms of number of hops, this attack instance is
abandoned.
Second, if all the paths match in the number of hops, we measure end-to-end latency
between our attack instance and the target instance. Figure 3.22 shows a sample latency
distribution between an instance in a VPC with the micro type in availability zone 1a to all
live VPC instances in EC2. As we can see, most end-to-end latency values (over 99%)
are above 1ms, and in very rare cases (below 0.1%) the latency is below 0.850ms. We
perform such latency measurement from 18 sample VPC instances with different types
in different availability zones, and similar distribution is repeatedly observed. Based on
such observations and the heuristics that instances located on the same physical machine
should have lower latency than instances located in a different physical location, we set
a latency threshold for each type of instance in each availability zone. The threshold
is selected so that for an instance in a VPC with certain type and availability zone, the
end-to-end latency between the instance and 99.9% of all other VPC instances should
be above the threshold. For example, based on our measurement introduced above, if
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Table 3.4: The number of successfully identified targets.
Success

Success

Success

1a-t1.micro

1a-m1.small

16

13

1b-t1.micro

1b-m1.small

13

13

1d-t1.micro

1d-m1.small

12

18

1am1.medium
18
1bm1.medium
19
1dm1.medium
15

1a-m1.large
14
1b-m1.large
16
1d-m1.large
13

1am3.medium
16
1bm3.medium
20
1dm3.medium
14

1a-m3.large
17
1b-m3.large
17
1d-m3.large
18

we speculate that the target VPC instance is located in availability zone 1a with micro
type, the latency threshold is set to 0.850ms. Only if the end-to-end latency between a
probing instance and a target instance is below the threshold, will the probing instance
be considered as a co-residence candidate.
If the probing instance passes the two rounds of filtering, we will perform covertchannel construction to confirm co-residence.

3.5.4 VPC co-residence evaluation
To verify the feasibility of our VPC co-residence approach, we conducted a series of experiments in EC2. We first tested whether our approach can speculate the type and availability zone of a target instance correctly. We launched VPC instances in three availability
zones with six different types. For each combination, 20 instances were launched. We
applied our approach to speculate the type and availability zone of the target. If both the
type and availability zone are correctly inferred, we consider that the target instance is correctly identified. Table 3.4 lists our evaluation results. Each number in the table indicates
the number of the successfully identified instances among the 20 launched instances for
a zone-type combination (e.g., 1a-t1.micro means t1.micro instances launched in the useast-1a zone). The results show that our type/zone speculation can achieve an accuracy
of 77.8%.
We then evaluated the overall effectiveness of our approach for achieving co-residence.
We launched 40 instances in one VPC, with different types and availability zones. We
performed the full process of achieving co-residence with VPC instances.
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Figure 3.23: The effort for co-residence with instances in VPC.
First, we measured the effectiveness of our two-stage filtering technique. Among all
the probing instances we launched, 63.2% of them did not pass the first step filtering.
For the second stage, our technique filtered out 97.9% of the instances that passed the
first stage filtering. For all the instances passed the two-stages filtering, 17.6% of them
passed the covert-channel verification, which are the instances actually co-resident with
the target.
Eventually, among 40 instances, we successfully achieved co-residence with 18 of
them. Figure 3.23 illustrates the effort we paid to achieve co-residence, showing that to
achieve co-residence in VPC is not an easy task. An attacker may need to launch more
than 1,000 probing instances and such a process can take many hours.
Overall, we are the first to demonstrate that an attacker can achieve co-resident with
a target inside a VPC with high cost, and hence VPC only mitigates co-residence threat
rather than eliminating the threat all together.
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3.6

A More Secure Cloud

Based on our measurement analysis, we have proposed some guidelines towards more
secure IaaS cloud management.
First, the cloud should manage the naming system properly. In general, a domain
name is not sensitive information. However, EC2’s automatic naming system reveals its
internal space. In contrast, Azure and Rackspace employ flexible naming systems that
can prevent automatic location probing. However, automatic domain name generation is
more user-friendly since it allows a user to launch instances in batch, while a customer
can only launch instances one by one in Azure and Rackspace. Moreover, automatic
domain name generation can help an IaaS vendor manage the cloud more efficiently.
To balance management efficiency and security, we suggest that IaaS clouds integrate
automatic domain name generation with a certain randomness. For example, a random
number that is derived from the customer’s account information can be embedded into the
EC2 default domain name. This improved naming approach can prevent location probing
while not degrading management efficiency.
Second, it is controversial to publish all IP ranges of a cloud. With the introduction of
ZMap [41], it is not difficult to scan all public IPs in the cloud. We have demonstrated that
such scanning can cause serious security concerns.
Third, the routing information should be well-protected. While trace-routing is a tool
for a customer to diagnose a networking anomaly, it can also be exploited by an attacker
to infer the internal networking information of the cloud. However, the approach taken
by Azure and Rackspace is too strict. The prohibition of networking probing deprives a
customer from self-diagnosis and self-management. A good trade-off is to show only part
of the paths, but always obscure the first hop (ToR) and the last second hop.
Fourth, VM placement should be more dynamic and have more constraints. Locality
reduction will make it more difficult for an attacker to locate a target. IaaS vendors can also
leverage some historical information of a user’s account to prevent the abuse of launching
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instances. While EC2 has significantly increased the difficulty of achieving machine-level
co-residence, it is also necessary to suppress rack-level co-residence in the future.

3.7

Conclusion

We have presented a systematic measurement study on the co-residence threat in Amazon EC2, from the perspectives of VM placement, network management, and VPC. In
terms of VM placement, we have demonstrated that time locality in VM placement is
significantly reduced and VM placement in EC2 becomes more dynamic, indicating that
EC2 has adjusted its VM placement policy to mitigate co-residence. Regarding network
management, by conducting a large-scale trace-routing measurement, we have shown
that EC2 has refined networking configurations and introduced VPC to reduce the threat
of co-residence. We have also proposed a novel method to identify a ToR-connected
or non-ToR-connected topology, which can help an attacker to achieve rack-level coresidence. As the first to investigate the co-residence threat in VPC, on one hand, we
have confirmed the effectiveness of VPC in mitigating the co-residence threat. On the
other hand, we have shown that an attacker can still achieve co-residence by exploiting
a latency-based probing method, indicating that VPC only mitigates co-residence threat
rather than eliminating the threat.
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Chapter 4

High Fidelity Data Reduction for Big
Data Security Dependency
Analyses
In this chapter, we present our work to perform high fidelity data reduction for big data
security dependency analyses to enhance cloud security.
Our previous works already demonstrate that even with significant defense efforts,
cloud is still facing various old and new security threats. To further enhance the security
in a cloud, especially with the pervasion of Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attacks in
private cloud, it becomes more and more desired to keep a long time of system audit
logs, which will be used to perform correlation analysis to reveal an attack and perform
anomaly/attack provenance.
To achieve fast dependency correlation analysis or to promptly connect the dots even
interleaved with multiple normal activities, the data has to be efficiently stored and indexed. Therefore, how to meet these storage and retrieval requirements for such a bigdata system is a daunting task. While it is challenging to mitigate the problem of overwhelmingly big-data of attack provenance derived from system-level audit events for dependency analysis, in this chapter we take a novel perspective and study the impact of dif92

ferent events. We found that some events have identical dependency impact scope, and
therefore they can be safely aggregated. Based on this observation, we propose an algorithm called Causality Preserved Reduction (CPR) for event aggregation. Furthermore,
we found that certain popular system behaviors lead to dense connected dependency
graphs of objects and their related neighbors. Thus, we devise a causality-preserving 1hop graph reduction technique called Process-centric Causality Approximation Reduction
(PCAR), which can further improve data reduction with very few false positives.
To validate the efficacy of our proposed approach, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation on real world auditing systems using more than one-month log traces. Our evaluation results demonstrate that the CPR algorithm is general and does not lose any accuracy by design, which can improve the capacity of a big-data system by up to 3.4 times.
In other words, the same system can store 3.4 times more data without affecting storage
and data processing efficiency. With a trade off of introducing very few false positives (in
our evaluation at the rate of 0.2%), The PCAR algorithm can enlarge the capacity of the
system by up to 5.6 times. We also compared our approach with a naive time-window
based data aggregation. We show that the naive approach introduces much more false
positives at the rate of 13.9%. Without considering manually tune our approach for each
application in an enterprise environment, we achieve a similar reduction ratio as LogGC,
but our solution can be combined with LogGC together to achieve more significant data
reduction.
The major contributions of our work can be summarized as follows:
• Through intensive data collection and analysis, we observe that some events have
identical contribution to dependency analysis and thus can be aggregated. Based
on this observation, we propose the CPR algorithm for data reduction.
• We further observe that some high-level system behaviors such as PCI scanning
will result in dense 1-hop dependency graphs, and such a subgraph as whole is
more useful than its internal structures. Thus, we propose the PCAR algorithm,
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which can achieve even higher data reduction with few false positives.
• We conduct a comprehensive evaluation over extensive datasets collected from a
real enterprise environment for one month period. The evaluation results demonstrate that our approach can improve the efficiency of forensic analysis up to 5.6
times without losing accuracy.
• Our work will facilitate the detection of APT-like attack behaviors that involve multiple
steps of malicious behaviors i.e., dots whose footprints buried inside data gathered
from multiple hosts over a long period of time.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the
background and motivates our work. Section 4.2 provides the definitions and design
details of our work. Section 4.3 presents our real world data driven evaluation. Section
4.4 surveys related works, and finally, Section 4.5 draws the conclusion.

4.1

Background and Motivation

In this section, we first briefly introduce the basic concept of system dependency graph
and causality tracking. Then, we present our observation of data characteristics of low
level system event traces. Finally, we provide an intuition-based description of how to
reduce event trace data while preserving its embedded causal dependencies.

4.1.1 System Dependency Analysis
A system event trace is a sequence of recorded interactions among multiple system objects (processes, files, network connections, etc.). It contains information, such as timing, type of operation, and information flow directions, which can be used to reconstruct
causal dependencies between historical events. For ease of discussion, we use the terms
causality and dependency interchangeably in this dissertation.
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Intuitively, we present a system event as an edge between two nodes, each represents
the initiator or the target of the interaction. For example, a process named “/bin/bash”
read a file named “/etc/bashrc”, is represented as node A, B and edge eBA−1 , shown
in Figure 4.1 denoting read operation from A to B occurred during the time interval of
[10, 20].
While each node and edge carries many pieces of information, such as process ID,
file permissions, etc., for simplicity, we only show the ones critical to causality analysis:
the type of event, presented as text under the edge name; the window of time the event
took place, presented as a pair of numbers in square brackets, denoting the start and end
timestamp, respectively; and the information flow direction, presented by the direction of
the edge. Note that dependency graph allows multiple number of edges for a node pair to
distinguish events happened from different time intervals. For instance, edges of eBA−1
and eBA−2 represent the same type of event occurred in different time durations.

A: /bin/bash
B: /etc/bashrc
C: /etc/inputrc
D: /bin/wget
E: /usr/bin/vi

eEC-1

E

Write [2,8]

eCA-1

eBA-1

Read [10,20] Read [15,23]

B

C

eBA-2
Read [40, 42]

eCA-2

A

Read [28,32]

POI Event

eAD-1

Relevant Event
Irrelevant Event

D

Exec [36, 37]

Figure 4.1: Dependency Graph and Backtracking
Illustrated by Figure 4.1, a trace of system events form networks of causality dependencies, i.e., the dependency graph. Dependency graph is essential to many forensic
analysis applications, such as root cause diagnosis, intrusion recovery, attack impact
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analysis, forward tracking [55] etc., which performs causality tracking on the dependency
graph. Causality tracking is an recursive graph traversal procedure, which follows the
causal relationship of edges either in the forward or backward direction. For example, in
Figure 4.1, to examine the root cause of event eAD−1 (“/bin/bash” executes “/bin/wget”),
we apply backtracking [54], on our Point-Of-Interest (POI) edge, which recursively follows
all edges that could have contributed to the occurrence of POI. Edges of eBA−1 , eCA−1 ,
eCA−2 , and eEC−1 have their starting time earlier than their predecessors therefore identified as relevant events.

4.1.1.1

Backtracking and Forwardtracking Algorithm

Performing backtracking and forwardtracking on a depGraph will return a connected subgraph rooted at the POI event as the result. We call the result graph the backtracking
graph/forwardtracking graph. For a graph G, after performing backtracking algorithm BT
with edge e as the starting point, we can get a backtracking graph GB , denoted as BT(G,
e)=GB s.t. GB ⊆G.
For a graph G, after performance forwardtracking algorithm FT with edge e as the starting point, we can get a forwardtracking graph GF , denoted as FT(G, e)=GF s.t. GF ⊆G.
While there are many variants of backtracking and forwardtracking, they are all based
on basic algorithm that is based on temporal reachability. Algorithm 1 demonstrates how a
basic backtracking is performed with temporal dependency. A key concept in backtracking
and forwardtracking is so called time threshold. In each step of backtracking, a threshold
will be generated. The threshold defines the temporal reachability from current event to
the POI event. Only when an event happens before current threshold can it be included
in the backtracking results. At the beginning, the threshold is initialized to be the end
time of the POI event and all incoming edges of the source node of the POI event will be
checked. After that in each iteration, the threshold will be updated by the current edge
beginning tracked. The threshold is updated to be the minimum of current threshold and
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Figure 4.2: Example of a dependency graph
the end time of current event being checked before going to next iteration. As we can
see, the threshold through the tracking process will finally determine the tracking results.
For the rest of the section, we use d(e) to present the current time threshold that will
determine whether edge e should be included in the tracking results. Particularly, db (e)
represents the backtracking threshold and df (e) is the current forwardtracking threshold.
After d(e) is populated by edge e, the new threshold is denoted as th(e).
Figure 4.3 illustrate the results of backtracking on dependency graph in Figure 4.2 with
POI event of eAF −1 . The initial time threshold is set to be the end time of eAF −1 , which
is 100. For all incoming edges of A, eBA−1 and eBA−1 started before 100 therefore they
will be included in backtracking graph. The threshold is then populated with the end time
of the eBA−1 and eBA−2 . Next for all incoming edges of B, eCB−1 and eCB−2 start before
the threshold and they will be included in the backtracking graph.
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Algorithm 1 Backtracking Algorithm
function BACKTRACK(depGraph G, Detection Point d)
Let S be a stack of < edges, threshold >
Let Ef be the set of edges in backtracking graph
Ef ←∅
S.PUSH(d, d.ENDTIME)
while ¬S.EMPTY do
T←S.POP
e←T.edge
n←e.SOURCE
th←T.threshold
Ef ←Ef ∪e
for all i∈n.INCOMINGEDGES do
st←i.STARTTIME
et←i.ENDTIME
if st<th then
THRESHOLD=min{et, th}
S.PUSH(< i, T HRESHOLD >)
end if
end for
end while
return Ef
end function
Forwardtracking is essentially a reverse version of backtracking. Instead of selecting
all edges that are temporally reachable to the POI event, forwardtracking selects all edges
that POI event can temporally reach. Algorithm wise, the initial threshold will be the start
time of the POI event, whether an edge should be included will be decided based on the
threshold and end time(instead of start time in backtracking), and the threshold is populated based on the maximum of start time of traversed edge and the current threshold.
Figure 4.4 illustrate the results of forwardtracking on dependency graph in Figure 4.2
with POI event of eAF −1 . the initial threshold is set to be the start time of eAF −1 , which
is 70. For all outgoing edges of F, eF H−1 and eF H−1 end after the threshold, therefore
they will be included in the forwardtracking graph. Next hop, since eHI−1 ends after the
threshold populated by eF H−1 , which is 110, it will be included in forwardtracking graph.
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eCB-2

C

eCB-1

B
eBA-2

eBA-1
A
eAF-1
F

Figure 4.3: Backtracking results with eAF −1 as POI
4.1.1.2

Threshold Population

For a graph G, with backtracking algorithm BT, the threshold will be populated by each
edge traversed. We denote the threshold population function as BTH(e,th) where e is the
edge being traversed and th is the current threshold.
1. If th<ts(e), BTH(e,th)=−∞.
2. If ts(e)≤th≤te(e), BTH(e,th)=th.
3. If th>te(e), BTH(e,th)=te(e).
Similary, with forwardtracking algorithm FT, the threshold populated by edge e is denoted as FTH(e,th) where th=fth(e,es )
1. If th>te(e), FTH(e,th)=+∞.
2. If ts(e)≤th≤te(e), FTH(e,th)=th.
3. If th<ts(e), FTH(e,th)=ts(e).
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Figure 4.4: Forwardtracking results with eAF −1 as POI
If tracking starts from es , We always have bth(es ,th)=te(es ) and fth(es ,th)=ts(es ).
Theorem 1 For a graph G, an edge e with tw(e)={t1 , t2 },
1. ∀th, we have t1 ≤ BT H(e, th) ≤ t2 or BTH(e,th)=−∞.
2. ∀th, we have t1 ≤ F T H(e, th) ≤ t2 or FTH(e,th)=+∞.
This theorem states that, the populated threshold is determined by the traversed edge.

4.1.2 Data Characteristics
The accuracy of system dependency analysis heavily depends on the granularity of event
trace – the finer grained the data, the more accurate the analysis results.
We built a ubiquitous monitoring system for enterprise security analyses, which collects low level system events from Linux and Windows machines using kernel audit [11]
and ETW kernel event tracing [8], respectively. We observe that an average desktop computer produces over 1 million events per day, while a server could yield 10 to 100 times the
volume. Each day, a rather small 100 computer system generated more than 200 million
events, which requires an mid-high end server to process and produces databases over
200GB. A large enterprise can easily have more than 100,000 computers, and may require to store the monitored data for several months or even years. Such workload made
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it impractical to deploy accurate dependency analysis to large enterprises. Reducing the
data volume is a key to solve the scalability problem.
While data reduction is a well-studied topic, the most commonly used techniques,
spatial and temporal sampling, are not applicable to dependency analysis based on system event traces. Because sampling techniques do not have inherit concept of causal
relations, they are prone to introducing random causal errors. On the other hand, the
recursive nature of causality tracking exponentially magnifies errors on the causal path –
a single falsely introduced dependency when tracked forward or backward several hops
could easily leads to hundreds of false positives. Therefore, any practical data reduction
on system event traces must take great care to limit introduction of causal errors.

4.1.3 Data Reduction Insights
Recognizing their critical importance, we first explore all possibilities to perform data reduction while perfectly preserve the causal dependencies. By studying causal relations of
every event in our system traces, we discover that only a small fraction of events, which
we call “key events”, bear causal significances to other events. Moreover, for each “key
event” there exist a series of “shadowed events” whose causal relations to other events
are negligible in the presence of the “key event”. That is, the presence or absence of
“shadowed events” does not alter any causality analysis. Therefore, we could significantly
reduce data volume while keeping the causal dependencies intact, by merging/summarizing information in “shadowed events” into “key events” while preserving causal relevant
information in the latter.
Figure 4.5 shows an example of unequal dependencies re-visiting our backtracking
example shown in Figure 4.1. In this figure, we backtrack POI event eAD−1 to eBA−1 ,
eCA−1 , eCA−2 , and eEC−1 . However, note that eCA−2 took place after eCA−1 , while no
event involves either A or C happen in between, and both events are of the same type
(Read). As a result, the existence of eCA−1 in this graph has no causal impact to backward
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A: /bin/bash
B: /etc/bashrc
C: /etc/inputrc
D: /bin/wget
E: /usr/bin/vi

eEC-1

E

Write [2,8]

eCA-1

eBA-1

Read [10,20] Read [15,23]

B

C

eBA-2

eCA-2

A

POI Event Read [40, 42]
Read [28,32]
Key Event
D
eAD-1
Shadowed Event
Exec [36, 37]
Irrelevant Event
Figure 4.5: Unequal Dependencies in Backtracking
dependency analysis. In other words, the presence of the “key event” eCA−2 shadows the
event eCA−1 . Therefore, eCA−1 can be removed by combining its information with eCA−2 ,
preserving the end time of the latter.

A: /bin/bash
C: /etc/inputrc
E: /usr/bin/vi
F: /bin/sed

eEC-1
E

Write [2,8]

eCA-1
Read [15,23]

POI Event
Key Event
Shadowed Event
Irrelevant Event

eCF-1
Write [24, 26]

C

A

eCA-2
Read [28,32]

F

eCF-2
Read [20, 22]

Figure 4.6: Unequal Dependency in Forward-tracking
In Figure 4.6), we apply similar logic to identify unequal dependencies in forwardtracking analysis [55] where edge eEC−1 represents POI event. For two edges that connects node C and A, event eCA−1 took place before eCA−2 , while no event involves either
A or C happen in between, and both events are of the same type, therefore “key event”
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eCA−1 shadows event eCA−2 .

A: /bin/bash
B: /etc/bashrc
C: /etc/inputrc
D: /bin/wget
G: /bin/scp
H: /bin/pico

eGB-1

G

Write [1,5]

eHB-1
Write [36,38]

B
H

POI Event

eCA-1

eBA-1

Read [15,23]

Read [10,20]

eBA-2

A

Read [40, 42]

Key Event
Shadowed Event

C

eCA-2
Read [28,32]

eAD-1

D

Exec [36, 37]

Figure 4.7: Dependency Reduction in Bi-directional Tracking
When bi-directional tracking is concerned, the condition for event shadowing become
more strict. Figure 4.7 combines backward and forward tracking into a single data dependency graph defining POI event as eHB−1 and eAD−1 , respectively. While “key event”
eCA−2 shadows the event eCA−1 for both analyses, event eBA−1 and eBA−2 must be kept
as independent “key events”, since each event defines causal relation from different analyses.

4.1.3.1

Low-loss Dependency Approximation

With further study of our data, we discover that several applications (mostly system daemons) tend to produce intense bursts of events that appears semantically similar, but are
not reducible by the perfect causality preserving reduction, due to interleaved dependencies. For example, process “pcscd” repeatedly interleave read/write access to a set of
files. We name this type of workload “iBurst”.
We performed in-depth analysis of those applications and found that each iBurst is
generated by application perform a single high-level operation, such as checking existence of PCI device, scanning files in a directory, etc. Those high level operations are not
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complex, but they translate to highly repetitive low level operations. With iBurst, data
reduction is only possible with certain level of loss in causality. We then analyze whether
and to what extent causality loss is acceptable. Form the causality analysis applications’
perspective, tracking down to the high level operations usually yields enough information
to aid the understanding of the results. For example, “pcscd” is check all PCI devices, or
“dropbox” is scanning the directory, etc. Although obtaining precise low level operation
dependencies does yield more information, the extra data usually do not add much more
value. Therefore, accuracy loss seems acceptable as long as we contain the impact of
the errors to not affect events that do not belong to the burst.

A: /bin/pcscd
B: /dev/sda0
C: /dev/ppp0
D: /dev/tty1
E: /bin/dd
F: /bin/mount

E

eCA-2

eEC-1

Read [30,40]

Write [1, 5]

D

C

eAD-1

eCA-1
Read [10,20]

A

eAB-1

eAB-2

Event of Interest

Write [75,78]

Key Event
Approx. Shadowed Event

Write [15, 25]

B

Write [50,60]

EBF-1
Read [70, 80]

F

Figure 4.8: Dependency Approximation Reduction Example
We thus devise a method to detect an iBurst and apply well-controlled dependency
approximation reduction, which ensures causality loss only impact events within the iBurst.
Shown in Figure 4.8, the “/bin/pcscd” process generates an iBurst involving many files,
including “/dev/sda0”, “/dev/ppp0”, and “/dev/tty1”, highlighted by the dashed circle. By
ignoring the causal relationship among all events within the iBurst, event eCA−2 is considered approximately shadowed by eCA−1 , even though they are interleaved by eAD−1 .
However, eAB−1 and eAB−2 must be kept an independent key event because they are
interleaved by eBF −1 , which does not belong to the iBurst.
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4.2

Design

In this section, we first present a formal definition of important terms and concepts used in
our design. Then we detail our algorithm used in data reduction. Our approach provides
two schemes that serve to different reduction goals. While the primary scheme prioritize
perfect dependency preservation, the optional secondary scheme performs causality approximating reduction to gain better reduction rates at the expense of limited dependency
accuracy loss. Finally, we describe an extension to incorporate domain knowledge based
data reduction.

4.2.1 Definitions
The formal definitions of three key concepts which are key to our data reduction design
are given below.
For the rest of the dissertation, tw(e) is used represent the time window associated
with an event, ts(e) and te(e) defines the start time and end time of event e, respectively.
We use the term event and edge, entity and node interchangeably.

4.2.1.1

Event Aggregability

Two events are aggregatable only if they have the same type and share the same source
and destination entities. For certain type of events such as file read/write, we also require
that the two events should share the same certain attributes, e.g., the file open descriptor.

DEFINITION 1: Event Aggregability.
For two event edges e1 =(u1 ,v1 ) and e2 =(u2 ,v2 ), they are aggregatable, denoted as e1 ∼e2 ,
if and only if
1. u1 =u2 , v1 =v2
2. R(e1 )=R(e2 ), where R(e) returns a type of e
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3. for a set of attributes A⊆Λ, ∀ ai ∈A, ai (e1 )=ai (e2 ), Λ denotes set all attributes
For a given definition, without loss of generality, if e1 ∼e2 and e2 ∼e3 , then e1 ∼e3 .

4.2.1.2

Event Trackability

While each event has causality with other events in the system, we use a term called
trackability to summarize the causality dependency information contained in an event.
We define trackability as the forensic analysis results that can be derived from an event,
i.e. the backtracking and forwardtracking results with the event as an POI event.

DEFINITION 2: Trackability Equivalence.
If two events yield the same backtracking and forwardtracking results as different POI
events, we say these two events are trackability equivalent.
• For two events e1 and e2 , if e1 ∼e2 and backtracking results without e1 and without
e2 are equivalent, we call e1 and e2 are backward trackability equivalent, denoted
as e1 ≈B e2 .
• For two events e1 and e2 , if e1 ∼e2 and forwardtracking results without e1 and without
e2 are equivalent, we call e1 and e2 are forward trackability equivalent, denoted as
e 1 ≈ F e2 .
For two events e1 and e2 , if they are both backward and forward trackability equivalent,
i.e., if e1 ≈B e2 and e1 ≈F e2 , we call e1 and e2 have the same trackability for both analyses,
denoted as e1 ≈e2 .

4.2.1.3

Forensic Analysis Quality

The forensic analysis quality lies in two folds. On one hand, the results should cover the
complete causality dependency flow that is desired; on the other hand, the results should
introduce as little noise as possible. In terms of backtracking and forwardtracking results,
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the quality can be measured with two metrics: the entities included and the connectivity
between entities.

DEFINITION 3: Forensic Analysis Quality.
For two sets of tracking results G1 and G2 derived a dependency graph G, they have the
same quality if the following conditions hold.
1. G1 and G2 share the same set of entities.
2. ∀ e∈G1 , ∃e′ ∈G2 , s.t. e∼e′ .
3. ∀ e∈G2 , ∃e′ ∈G1 , s.t. e∼e′ .

4.2.2 Causality Preserved Reduction
Our primary reduction scheme aims at preserving causality dependency while performing
the data reduction. Therefore, we name it as Causality Preserved Reduction (CPR). The
core idea is to aggregate all those events that are aggregatable and share the same
trackability.
Algorithm 2 shows the working procedure of CPR, in which a stream of events sorted
by starting time are taken as input. We maintain a stack for each type of event between a
pair of entities. Every time when we observe an event between the same pair of entities
with same type, we will check whether the events can be aggregated with the event in
stack. This aggregation checking includes the examination of both forward and backward
trackability.
Algorithm 3 describes the procedure to check the backward-trackability. For two
events e1 and e2 from entity u to entity v, they have the same backward trackability if
all the time windows of incoming events of u do not overlap with the time window of
[te(e1 ),te(e2 )]. Algorithm 4 describes the procedure to check the forward-trackability. For
two events e1 and e2 from entity u to entity v, they have the same forward trackability if
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Algorithm 2 Causality Preserved Aggregation
Require: E is event stream sorted by start time in ascending order
function CPR_AGGREGATE(E)
for each e in E do
u←src(e)
v←dst(e)
Let S(u,v,R(e)) be a stack of events from u to v that are aggregatable
if S.Empty then
S.push(e)
else
ep ←S.pop
if FORWARD_CHECK(ep ,e,v) & BACKWARD_CHECK(ep ,e,u) then
ep ←MERGE(ep ,e)
S.push(ep )
else
S.push(e)
end if
end if
end for
end function
function MERGE((ep , el ))
te(ep )←te(el )
Tune attributes of ep
DELETE(el )
return ep
end function
none of outgoing events of v has an end time between the start time of e1 and the start
time of e2 .
If two events can be aggregated, we aggregate the event with a later start time (i.e.,
the later event) to the event with an earlier start time (i.e., the former event) by extending
the end time of the former event to the end time of the later event and then discard the
later event.

4.2.2.1

Backward trackability

According to our backward algorithm, for two aggregatable events e1 and e2 from u to v,
they have the same backward trackability only if none of incoming events of u has a time
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Algorithm 3 Backward Trackability Check
function BACKWARD_CHECK(ep ,el ,u)
for each e of u.INCOMING_EVENT do
if tw(e) overlap with [te(ep ),te(el )] then
return false
end if
end for
return true
end function
Algorithm 4 Forward Trackability Check
function FORWARD_CHECK(ep ,el ,v)
for each e of v.OUTGOING_EVENT do
if tw(e) overlap with [ts(ep ),ts(el )] then
return false
end if
end for
return true
end function
window overlapped with the time window between the end time of e1 and the end time of
e2 .
For any incoming event e of entity u, its time window can fall into one of the following
three cases, which are illustrated in Figure 4.9:
1. te(e)<te(e1 ), i.e., the time window of e only overlaps with the yellow shadow of Area
B.
2. te(e)>te(e1 ) and ts(e)<te(e2 ), i.e., the time window of e has an overlap with the red
shadow of Area B.
3. ts(e)>te(e2 ), i.e., the time window of e only overlaps with the blue shadow of Area
B. Selecting e1 as a POI event, the threshold will be set to te(e1 ); selecting e2 as a
POI event, the threshold will be set to te(e2 ).
In the first case, e has dependency with both e1 and e2 . According to the backtracking
algorithm, the event will be included into the result set no matter whether we choose e1 or
109

B

u
e1

v

ts(e1)

e2
te(e1)

ts(e2)

te(e2)

F

Figure 4.9: Determine whether to aggregate two events between u and v.
e2 as a POI event. Moreover, the threshold will be updated to the end time of the incoming
event of u in both backtracking situations. The second case has another two sub-cases:
a) ts(e)>te(e1 ) and b) ts(e)<te(e1 ). In a), the event only has dependency with e2 , and
thus choosing e1 or e2 as a POI event generates different backtracking results, which will
break the trackability equivalence of e1 and e2 . In b), although the event has dependency
with both e1 and e2 , selecting e1 as a POI event will make the populated threshold to
be te(e1 ) while selecting e2 as a detection point will make the populated threshold to be
min{te(e1 ), te(e)}. Such a situation will possibly make backtracking results different in the
following iterations, which also breaks the trackability equivalence of e1 and e2 . In the
third case, the event has no dependency with e1 or e2 , implying that it will not be included
in backtracking results anyway. As we can see, only case 2 can break the backward
trackability equivalence. Thus, our algorithm will stop aggregating the two events if case
2 is reached.

4.2.2.2

Forward trackability

According to our forward algorithm, for two aggregatable events e1 and e2 from u to v,
they have the same forward trackability only if none of outgoing events of entity v has a
time window overlapped with the time window between the start time of e1 and the start
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time of e2 .
For any outgoing event e of entity v, its time window can fall into one of the following
three cases, illustrated in Figure 4.9:
1. te(e)<ts(e1 ), i.e., the time window only overlaps with the yellow shadow of Area F.
2. te(e)>ts(e1 ) and ts(e)<ts(e2 ), i.e., the time window has an overlap with the red
shadow of Area F.
3. ts(e)>ts(e2 ), i.e., the time window only overlaps with the blue shadow of Area F.
In the first case, e has no dependency with e1 or e2 , it will not be included in forwardtracking results. The second case also has two sub-cases: a) te(e)<ts(e2 ) and
b) te(e)>ts(e2 ). In a), the event only has dependency with e1 , breaking the trackability equivalence of e1 and e2 . In b), the threshold populated with e1 as a POI event will be
max{ts(e1 ), ts(e)} while the threshold populated with e2 as a POI event will be ts(e2 ). Different populated thresholds will also break the trackability equivalence. In the third case,
e has dependency with both e1 and e2 and the populated threshold is ts(e).
As we can see, only case 2 can break the forward trackability equivalence. Thus, our
algorithm will stop aggregating the two events if case 2 is reached.

4.2.2.3

Tracking with an aggregated event

Given that e1 and e2 pass the backward and forward checkings of our algorithms, they
will be aggregated and replaced with a new event e′ . All the attributes of e1 and e2 will be
copied to e′ except that the time window of e′ will become [ts(e1 ), te(e2 )]. If e′ is selected as
an POI event, the backtracking threshold will be te(e2 ) and the forwardtracking threshold
will be ts(e1 ). Because all incoming events of entity u and all outgoing events of v satisfy
the conditions set by our algorithms, the backtracking and forwardtracking results with e′
as the POI event should be the same as those with e1 or e2 as the POI event.
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4.2.2.4

Impact on tracking with other POI events

When we apply our data reduction, we attempt to aggregate all those events that share
the same trackability no matter whether they will be selected as POI events.
To continue the example above, assume we start in another POI event to perform
backtracking. While reaching the step we need to check the incoming events of entity v,
we have a threshold th. With data without reduction we need to check event e1 and e2 ,
but with the reduced data we need to check event e′ . Since no outgoing events of v have
the end time falling into the range of [ts(e1 ), ts(e2 )], according to the threshold population
algorithm, th should not fall into this range either. This leaves two cases for th: th <ts(e1 )
and th >ts(e2 ). In the first case, with the raw data e1 and e2 will both fail the dependency
check and will not be included in the backtracking graph. With the reduced data, e′ will
not pass the dependency check either, yielding the same results with the data without
reduction: entity u and the events from u to v will not appear in the backtracking results.
In the second case, with the raw data, both e1 and e2 will be included in the backtracking
graph and the threshold will be populated.
Note that, since all events that happen before e1 will also happen before e2 , it means e1
will be shadowed by e2 while performing backtracking with other POI events in this case.
Therefore we only need to populate the threshold with e2 , which would be min{th, te(e2 )}.
With the reduced data, e′ will be included with the populated threshold min{th, te(e2 )}.
Therefore, entity u will be included in the backtracking results with both raw data and
reduced data. And the connectivity between u and v will be kept as well with the data
reduction.
The same procedure can also be applied to forwardtracking. Since no incoming events
of u can have the start time in [te(e1 ), te(e2 )], in the tracking process while reaching u, the
threshold cannot fall into [te(e1 ), te(e2 )]. Therefore, in forwardtracking of such case, e2 will
be shadowed by e1 and aggregating e1 and e2 will preserve the entities and connectivity
in tracking results.
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4.2.3 Process-centric Causality Approximation Reduction
Our secondary data reduction scheme, Process-centric Causality Approximation Reduction (PCAR), aims to reduce data from intensive bursts of events with interleaved dependencies, which are otherwise not reducible without dependency loss. PCAR constrains
the causal dependencies compromise within the events within the burst, and achieves
data reduction with very limited impact to dependency analyses.
We define a process that interacts with a large number of objects in a short time a hot
process. Hot processes can be detected using simple statistics calculation with sliding
time window. Once a hot process is detected, we collect all objects involved in the interactions, and form a neighbor set N (u), where u is the hot process. Illustrate in Algorithm 5,
instead of equally checking the trackability on all aggregation candidates based on the
events, we only check the trackability with the information flow into and out of the neighbor set N (u). The checking procedure is the same as CPR of checking the time window
overlap. It can ensure that as long as the events inside the ego-net are not selected as a
POI event, we can achieve high quality tracking results.

4.2.4 Attack Resilience
Serving as the underlying support for forensic analysis, it is important that our technique
is resilient to attacks, such as data evasions.
Both CPR and PCAR are resilient against evasion attacks. For CPR, because it guarantee that no causal dependency is lost after data reduction, attacker simply cannot exploit CPR to distort the reality by any means. For PCAR, although it does cause dependency loss during data reduction, and attackers could even intentionally trigger the
dependency loss, it is still very difficult be exploited to cover any meaningful malicious
activities. This is because PCAR guarantee that any dependency loss is confined within
a single hop from a hot process. That is, one hot process can only weaken causality
between two events on any chain of dependences. And because our system event trace
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Algorithm 5 Process-centric approximation reduction
Require: E is a stream of events involving hot process and its neighbors N(u)
Require: E is sorted by start time
function PCAR_AGGREGATE(E)
Let Q be a queue holding events in N(u)
Q←∅
for each e do
s←src(e)
t←dst(e)
if s∈N(u)
/
then
N.IN_DEADLINE←te(e)
else if t∈N(u)
/
then
N.OUT_DEADLINE←te(e)
else
CLEARSTATE(N(u),e)
end if
end for
return N(u)
end function
function CLEARSTATE(N(u),e)
Let S(s,t,R(e)) be a stack of events aggregatable with e in Q
if S.IS_EMPTY then
S.PUSH(e)
else
ep ←S.POP
if s==u then
flag←PCAR_CHECK(ep ,e,N.IN_DEADLINE,out)
else if t==u then
flag←PCAR_CHECK(ep ,e,N.OUT_DEADLINE,in)
else
flag←true
end if
if flag then
MERGE(ep ,e)
end if
end if
return
end function
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Algorithm 6 Trackability check for hot processes
function PCAR_CHECK(ep ,el ,t,flag)
if t>te(ep ) then
return false
else if flag==out then
return FORWARD_CHECK(ep ,el , ep .dst)
else if flag==in then
return BACKWARD_CHECK(ep ,el , ep .src)
return true
end if
end function
monitors fairly low level system activities, no meaningful malicious actions could be performed within two events (e.g. a single ssh login consists of 4 hops of dependencies). In
addition, it is also undesirable for attacker to generate multiple hot processes, since doing
so significant enlarge their footprint, which defeats the purpose of evasion.

4.2.5 Domain Knowledge Reduction Extension
Besides exploiting causality, our work also utilizes domain knowledge to enhance our data
reduction.

4.2.5.1

Special files

In a Linux system, many system entities are treated as files and interact with processes
as file reads/writes. For instance, all device interfaces are regarded as files and can be
accessed via /dev directory. Shared memory can also be accessed as files under /shm
directory. All the files in a Linux system can be classified into two categories: plain file
and special file. Plain files refer to the files that have data stored in the disk and special
files refer to the files that are only abstraction of system resources.
For a plain file, when a process reads from it or writes to it, there will be an explicit
information flow occurred, which will be further used in backtracking or forward tracking.
By contrast, the interactions between processes and special files may involve more com-
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plex behaviors and implicit information flows. For instance, if process A writes to a plain
file and process B reads from the same file later, there is an explicit information flow from
A to B. However, if process A writes to something under /proc and process B reads from
the /proc file later, it is unlikely that there is an information flow from A to B. The reason
is that the files under /proc are mappings of kernel information, writing to them or reading
from them involves complex kernel activities that cannot be treated as a simple read/write,
resulting in no explicit information flow.
Based on such domain knowledge, we further integrate special files filter into our approach to remove events related to those special files that will not introduce any explicit
information flow.

4.2.5.2

Temporary files

In a system, there are many files that only serve temporarily and will be deleted afterwards.
Many processes need to store temporary information during execution, and hence generating files that only exist for a short period of time. Thus, these temporary files only
interact with the process that creates them.
Similar to previous work [59], we define a temporary file as a file that is only touched
by one process during its lifetime. Since a temporary file only has information exchange
with one process, it does not introduce any explicit information flow in attack forensics
either, and therefore we can remove all the events of temporary files from the data.

4.3

Evaluation

We implement a prototype of our proposed approach, which consists of CPR, PCAR, and
domain knowledge extension(which will be referred as DOM). Then we conduct a series
of experiments based on real world data collected from a corporate R&D laboratory, to
demonstrate the effectiveness of our data reduction approach, in terms of data processing
and storage capacity improvement and the support for forensic analysis.
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We also perform a break-down analysis to show the effectiveness of our approach on
different workload patterns, and therefore benefiting enterprises with different workloads.
Moreover, to fully evaluate our approach, we also implement a naive event aggregation
and conduct experiments for comparison. Finally, we measure the runtime overhead of
our data reduction system.

4.3.1 Data collection
In the corporate research laboratory from which our data is collected, we has deployed
an enterprise-wide audit system. There are monitoring agents deployed across servers,
desktops and laptops to collect system events. The audit system has been deployed
for over two years, among which we select one month of data, from mid-August to midSeptember in 2015 for our study. We choose this time period because during that time
many interns and visiting researchers were working on site, resulting in more diverse
data. The data logs we used are collected from more than 30 machines with various
server models and operating systems. All the data collected is stored in a daily basis,
i.e., the data of each day is stored in a separate database and there will be a separate
dependency graph generated from individual day’s data. There are more than 10 billion
events captured during our data collection.

4.3.2 Data reduction
We first evaluate the overall effectiveness of our approach in data reduction, and then
we present a break-down analysis to demonstrate how our solution works under different
workloads. Finally, we compare our approach with a naive aggregation in data reduction.
Our reduction system records how many events are aggregated and then reports the
reduction statistics. A reduced data volume has multi-fold significance. Most intuitively,
it results in saved storage capacity and less storage cost. Moreover, since our reduction
system is a module in the data processing stream, the reduced data will save bandwidth
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and improve the data processing capacity for the following modules. For instance, if
our system can reduce data by 80% and the following data processing module needs to
perform event queries on our output, our reduction can increase the processing capacity
of the query module by 5 times.

4.3.2.1

Overall effectiveness

For comparison reasons, the log data is processed in three phrases. In the first phrase, we
only apply CPR. In the second phrase, we further apply PCAR. Finally, we apply domain
knowledge reduction extension in third phrase.
Figure 4.10 shows the data reduction results of our system, i.e., the improvements on
the data processing and storage capacities after applying our data reduction techniques.
In total there are 31 hosts we collected data from, 18 of them have Linux as operating
systems and 13 of them have Windows as operating systems. For CPR, on average
it can achieve the reduction ratio of 56%, i.e., it can reduce the data size by 56%, and
thus increasing the data processing and storage capacities by 2.27 times (2.63 in Linux
and 1.61 in Windows, respectively). Next, if we apply CPR+PCAR, the overall reduction
ratio will be raised to 70%, which achieves 3.33 times growth in the data processing and
storage capacities (4 in Linux and 2.44 in Windows, respectively). Finally, after we apply
our domain knowledge reduction extension, the reduction ratio can reach 77%, which
increases the data processing and storage capacities by 4.35 times (5.26 in Linux and
2.56 in Windows, respectively).
It is evident that our system can effectively reduce data logs and improve data process and storage capacities in a significant fashion. Even with only CPR, the data size
can be reduced by more than half, increasing the data processing/storage capacities by
2 times; on certain hosts, our system can help to increase the data processing and storage capacities by more than 20 times. From Figure 4.10 we can see that at different
hosts, the benefits gained by our system vary. This is because different hosts run dif-
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Figure 4.10: The effectiveness of our system on improving data processing and storage
capacities
ferent workloads, and the effectiveness of our system is affected by different workloads.

4.3.2.2

Break-down analysis

Different workloads introduce different system activities, resulting in different process behaviors and different amount of event redundancy. Since the effectiveness of our system
is sensitive to different workloads, we need to conduct a break-down analysis to scrutinize
how our system works on different workloads.
We categorize the common workloads in an enterprise environment to the following
groups: system monitor, system utility, system daemon, file sharing, browser, office, communication, develop tools, programming, web server, database, and others. System monitoring includes the auditing and monitoring tools. System utility includes common utilities
in Linux or Windows such as mv, cp, ls, and etc. System daemons are these daemon
processes running in the background, such as pcscd, sshd, security scanning in Windows, and etc. File sharing represents the applications used to share files such as svn,
cvs, dropbox, and etc. Browser includes all types of browsers like chrome, IE, firefox,
and etc. All the applications used for writing documents are categorized to office, e.g.,
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Figure 4.11: The workload distribution of our collected data
vim, openoffice, powerpoint, excel, and etc. Communication includes mailing tools such
as gmail, voice tools like skype and remote access tools like ssh. Develop tools are those
dedicatedly used for production development such as Matlab, R, Eclipse, and etc. Programming refers to all kinds of programming language compilers like gcc, java, python
and etc. Web server includes tomcat, apache, jboss, and etc. Database includes these
processes running as database services like mysql, mangodb, and etc. Finally, all the
rest processes are categorized to others.
Figure 4.11 illustrates the workload pattern distribution in our collected data. Because
this work is conducted in a research institute, the workload pattern is skewed to system
monitoring, system utilities, system daemons, and programming. We can see that those
processes contribute to the majority of the events we captured.
Table 4.1 lists the breakdown analysis under different workload patterns, showing the
percentages of data reduction and the speedups on data processing and storage capacities. From the table we can see, CPR works well on most workloads. However, it works
poorly on system daemons, the reason has been explained previously: the daemon processes generally perform tasks that generate intensively interleaving events. That is also
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Table 4.1: The effectiveness of our data reduction system under different workloads
CPR

System Monitor
System Util
System Daemon
File Sharing
Browser
Office
Communication
Develop
Programming
Web Server
Database
Virtualization
Other

Linux
Red
Imp
55.2%
2.22
45.3%
1.83
30.6%
1.44
58.0%
2.38
70.4%
3.38
66.8%
3.01
22.2%
1.29
56.5%
2.30
68.4%
3.16
55.1%
2.23
21.2%
1.27
65.2%
2.87
42.1%
1.73

Windows
Red
Imp
32.1%
1.47
33.3%
1.50
37.8%
1.61
47.0%
1.89
41.8%
1.72
32.2%
1.47
18.2%
1.22
54.5%
2.20
38.4%
1.62
51.1%
2.04
31.1%
1.45
71.9%
3.56
45.1%
1.82

CPR+PCAR
Linux
Windows
Red
Imp
Red
Imp
71.7%
3.53
62.2%
2.65
77.2%
4.39
45.8%
1.85
82.1%
5.59
55.4%
2.24
71.1%
3.46
61.9%
2.62
72.6%
3.65
48.8%
1.95
71.2%
3.47
44.4%
1.80
31.8%
1.47
30.0%
1.43
75.2%
4.03
77.4%
4.42
71.5%
3.51
55.4%
2.24
72.1%
3.58
62.6%
2.67
33.2%
1.50
42.5%
1.74
66.7%
3.00
72.8%
3.68
48.9%
1.96
47.0%
1.89

CPR+PCAR+DOM
Linux
Windows
Red
Imp
Red
Imp
73.5%
3.77
63.6%
2.75
82.5%
5.71
57.6%
2.36
90.2%
10.20
58.3%
2.40
82.2%
5.62
81.9%
5.52
74.2%
3.88
61.1%
2.57
82.5%
5.71
70.7%
3.41
33.5%
1.50
31.5%
1.46
78.1%
4.57
78.1%
4.57
82.2%
5.62
60.1%
2.51
80.3%
5.08
70.7%
3.41
34.8%
1.53
47.6%
1.91
80.2%
5.05
73.0%
3.70
49.1%
1.96
47.2%
1.89

why PCAR works very well on such a type of workload. Some system utilities exhibit similar behaviors, and thus applying PCAR can improve their reduction ratios significantly.
Office workloads generate considerable temporary files, that is why our domain knowledge reduction extension works best on them. File sharing is also the workload that generates much interactions with temporary files (logs), and thus domain knowledge filtering
can help to improve the reduction ratio significantly.
The workload on which our approach is least effective is communication applications.
However, their workloads do not contribute much to the entire workload in an enterprise
environment. Database, on the other hand, could be one of the majority workloads in
certain circumstances and our approach works less effectively on them. However, our
system can still achieve an reduction ratio more than 40% and increase the data processing and storage capacities by 1.67 times.

4.3.2.3

Naive aggregation

The naive approach is based on the heuristics that events appeared in a short period
of time between two system entities tend to share similar behaviors. Thus, in this naive
approach, we blindly aggregate events in a fixed time window, without considering any
dependency.
We implement the naive aggregation approach in two ways. First, we fix the time
window to 10 seconds, i.e., we aggregate the events within a 10-second interval. Second,
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Figure 4.12: The comparison of naive aggregation with 10 seconds time window, CPR,
and naive aggregation with unlimited time window
we set the time window to unlimited, i.e., we will aggregate all aggregatable events in the
data. The second naive aggregation should be an upper bound of data reduction power
of any reduction approach that does not remove any entities and has the same event
aggregability definition as our approach.
Figure 4.12 shows the comparisons among the naive aggregation with 10 seconds
time window, CPR, and the naive aggregation with unlimited time window. On average,
the naive aggregation with 10 seconds time window can improve the data processing/storage capacity by 1.85 times, while CPR can increase the data processing/storage capacity
by 2.18. Thus, on average, CPR clearly outperforms the 10-second naive aggregation; in
many case, its improvement is close that of the upper bound (i.e., the naive aggregation
with unlimited time window).

4.3.3 Support of forensic analysis
Our data reduction approach is designed to support forensic analysis. Therefore, we
evaluate the quality of forensic analysis after applying our data reduction, i.e., whether
the entities and connectivity can be well preserved in tracking results after we apply our
data reduction techniques on the auditing data. Since forwardtracking is exactly a reverse
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version of backtracking, in our evaluation we focus on backtracking.
We manually produce some test cases during data collection to generate traces for
backtracking. These test cases are listed in column 1 of Table 4.2. We first perform
some attacks that exploit system vulnerabilities as test cases. The first two cases are the
attacks on Distcc where the vulnerability (CVE-2004-2687 [4]) allows a remote attacker
to execute an arbitrary command, such as nmap and passwd. The third case is the attack
on Freesweep, where a user downloads a malicious package that will create a backdoor
to the user’s system. The forth case is the attack on PHPCgi, where the vulnerability
(CVE-2012-1823 [5]) allows a remote attacker to inject malicious commands in a query.
The rest of test cases are series of operations in system, such as downloading a program
with Wget and using gcc to compile and execute it afterwards.
For comparison reasons, we perform backtracking on three copies of the data, respectively, the raw data, i.e., the data without any reduction, the data only reduced by
CPR, and the data reduced by CPR+PCAR.
Table 4.2 shows the connectivity change of backtracking on data before and after reduction. Since the entities are untouched anyway, we do not show the statistics of the
entities here. The connectivity reflects the quality of the backtracking. Multiple aggregatable events only contribute to one connectivity. As we can see, for these test cases, CPR
can perfectly preserve the connectivity and therefore maintaining a high quality tracking
results. PCAR is a more aggressive approach and in two cases it introduces false positive
connectivity, but the impact is still minor. Since in all cases, both CPR and PCAR do not
introduce any missing connectivity in the tracking results, we do not present the statistics
here.
To further investigate the impact upon attack forensics and compare with the naive
aggregation, we randomly select 20,000 POI events from the data and apply backtracking.
Table 4.3 illustrates the evaluation results for the naive aggregation with 10 seconds time
window, CPR and CPR+PCAR. The false positive column indicates that in how many
cases, the backtracking results introduce additional connectivity.
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Table 4.2: Backtracking results on data before and after reduction
Test Case
distcc_nmap
distcc_passwd
Freesweep
PHPCgi_nmap
Gzip
netcat_bashrc
Passwd
Pbzip
Useradd
Wget_gcc

Raw
84
72
38
56
5
432
17
25
7
19

CPR
84
72
38
56
5
432
17
25
7
19

CPR+PCAR
84
74
38
56
5
441
17
25
7
19

Table 4.3: Backtracking results on random POI event
Data

False positive

CPR
CPR+PCAR
naive

0
45
2778

Additional connectivity
0%
3.7%
17%

Additional entities
0
1.4%
8.8%

The additional connectivity/entities indicate that for the false positive cases, what is
the ratio of the extra connectivity and entities the false positive will introduce. Column 2
is calculated by dividing the number of extra connectivity introduced in all false positive
cases with the number of ground truth connectivity. Ground truth connectivity is one that
exists in the tracking results on data without reduction. Similar statistics are calculated
for entities and listed in column 3.
From the results we can see, while CPR can preserve the high quality of tracking,
PCAR will introduce very few false positives in rare cases (around 0.2%) and the impact
is limited. By contrast, the naive aggregation introduces false positives in more than 10%
cases, which will significantly degrade the quality of forensic analysis.

4.3.4 Runtime Performance
While data reduction is to trade data processing and storage capacities with pre-processing
overhead, it is important to keep the runtime overhead at a low level. According to our
algorithm design, both CPR and PCAR are linear in time complexity. We only need to
scan all events once and update the states with hash tables. We also profiling the run124
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Figure 4.13: The runtime memory consumption of our system
time memory and CPU consumption of our approach. Since the data is stored/processed
in a daily basis, our profiling lasts for one day as well. Figure 4.13 illustrates the memory
consumption of our complete system (CPR+PCAR+domain knowledge extension) over
time. The data rate is around 4000 events per second. As we can see from the figure,
the memory consumption is fluctuant. The reason lies in two-fold. On one hand, our system continues storing new events and updating new states; on the other hand, it keeps
outputting those events that cannot be aggregated and drops those events that are either
aggregated or discarded. Overall, the memory consumption remains in a low level under
2GB, which is a small overhead to any commercial server. As to the CPU consumption, a
single 2.5G Hz core can handle such a data rate easily. Thus, the CPU overhead is also
minor.

4.4

Related Work

Very limited work directly addresses the same issue on the reduction of big-data of attack provenance derived from system-level audit events. LogGC [59] is the most closest
work. It has three major ideas. (i) Some system objects such as temporary files are
isolated, have short life-span, and have little impact on the dependency analysis, so that
such objects and events can be garbage collected to save space. (ii) application specific
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adaptation by using the existing application logs (iii) application source modification to
output finer-grained dependency information. The (ii) and (iii) are application specific
adaptation, need human in the loop to understand and change approach for the specific
applications. The (i) and our approach are towards for general scheme. In our study with
an enterprise of couple hundred of hosts, we found a large number of diverse applications, so it is not easy to adopt application-specific approach. For general approaches,
we found our approach offers comparable reduction as LogGC. Furthermore, the two approaches are orthogonal. Their approach focuses on object life-span, and we focus on
event causality equivalence. The two approaches complimentary each other and can be
further combined.
The other data reduction works do not consider preserve the dependency path and
thus are not applicable to our problem. Some works of data aggregation aim at reducing
communication cost and improving data privacy [31, 34, 35, 38, 51, 48, 91]. Different from
these works, we focus on reducing system auditing data while supporting forensics analysis, more particularly, backtracking and forwardtracking. There are also other studies
exploiting graph techniques for data reduction [32, 90]. However, none of them leverages
dependency in data reduction.
Forensic analysis plays a very important role in security. King and Chen [54] proposed
a backtracking technique to perform intrusion analysis by automatically reconstructing a
chain of events in a dependency graph. Following this approach, various forensic analysis techniques have been developed in various scenarios such as recovering an intrusion [45], worm break-in detection [50], forensic analysis in virtualized environments [56],
binary level attack provenance [58], risk analysis in networks [73], and file system intrusion detection [78].
Although there are different tracking techniques, the key concept of exploiting the dependency between system events for analysis remains the same. Dependency graphs
have been widely used in system and security studies. Besides the usage of dependency
graph in forensic analysis [54, 45], researchers have leveraged dependency graphs to
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perform code generation on multiprocessor systems [22], identify user clicks in http requests [65], predict system failures [102], diagnose networkings failures [101], assess
attacks in enterprises [44], perform malware classification [97], and detect security failures in cloud environment [30].

4.5

Conclusion

In this chapter, we presented a novel approach that exploits dependency among system
events to reduce the size of data without compromising the accuracy of forensic analysis. Core to our contribution, we proposed the concept of trackability which determines
causality relation among system events. By aggregating events under a same trackability, our approach could summarize large amount of data preserving connections relevant
to a forensic analysis. Incorporated with domain knowledges specific to system process
behaviors, our prototype implemented data reduction for two type of forensic analyses,
backtracking and forwardtracking.
Evaluated over dataset gathered from real world enterprise environment, our results
shows that our approach improves space capacity by 3.4 times with no or least accuracy
compromise. Although the overall space and computational requirements for large-scale
data analysis remain challenging, we hope our data reduction approach will bring it closer
to become practical.
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Chapter 5

Conclusion and Future Work
The focus of this dissertation is on the study of cloud security from three different perspectives. First, we reveal a new security vulnerability in cloud infrastructures, named as
power attack that could cause power outages in a data center. Then, we investigate the
co-residence threat and its defense evolution inside a public cloud, and finally, we propose a novel security technique to achieve high fidelity data reduction for forensic analysis
in a private cloud. The three major contributions of this dissertation are summarized as
follows.
• While power oversubscription is becoming a trend to save energy in data centers,
we have revealed its vulnerability that can trip circuit breakers inside a data center to
cause massive damages. We have conducted extensive physical experiments in a
cluster-level testbed to verify the feasibility of a power attack with various attack vectors. We have further performed data center level simulation for the possibility of taking
down an entire data center with power attacks. With a deep study on other power management solutions, we have demonstrated that power attack is an increasing threat
that can be difficult to defend against.
• As a prerequisite of various malicious activities such as power attacks, co-residence is
a security threat that all public clouds should take into account. We have performed a
systematic study of the co-residence threat through extensive measurements on Ama128

zon EC2. By quantifying the co-residence threat and comparing with previous works,
we have shown the defense evolution inside the cloud. On one hand, the changes in
VM placement and networking management policies, as well as the newly introduced
defensive VPC service, demonstrate the significant efforts of cloud service vendors
for mitigating the co-residence threat. On the other hand, with our new techniques
to launch co-residence attacks in VPC, we have demonstrated that the co-residence
threat is still far from being eliminated.
• The increasing demand to defend against APT attacks in a private cloud yields increasingly large amount of audit logs. Since the data volume will directly affect the data
processing and storage capacity as well as the efficiency of forensic analysis, we have
proposed an effective data reduction technique that can significantly improve system
capacity while supporting high-quality forensic analysis. In particular, we have propose
CPR for exploiting causality dependency between system events to reduce data while
preserving causality. Furthermore, based on the special behaviors of certain system
processes, we have proposed PCAR as a more aggressive reduction approach that
approximates causality to achieve higher data reduction ratio. Our evaluation based
on more than one-month traces validates the efficacy of our approaches.
As various malicious attacks against clouds are increasingly thriving, cloud vendors
will seek more effective and efficient solutions to enhance cloud security . In our future
work, we will still focus on the investigation of cloud security issues from the offensive
and defensive perspectives. On the offensive side, we will explore new vulnerabilities in a
cloud environment, including a variant of power attack called thermal attack to inflict a data
center in a much more stealthy manner. We will also study on how to launch more effective
co-residence attacks in different cloud environments by exploiting the special features of
different cloud vendors. On the defensive side, we will develop effective defense against
power attacks and new cloud management solutions to mitigate co-residence attacks.
Moreover, we will attempt to tackle these intractable security problems such as DDoS
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attacks and APT attacks in cloud environments.
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